Who Needs Emotions? The Brain Meets the Robot

336 conclusions
emotion. How can we integrate the imagination of the novelist with the rigor
of the neurobiologist?
In the opening chapter of this book, our fictitious “Russell” argued for
the utility of definitions in the analysis of emotion, only to be rebuffed by
“Edison” with his emphasis on inventions. Being somewhat Russellian, let
me provide here some definitions based on those in the Oxford English Dictionary
(OED). While some biologists stress that everyday language often
lacks the rigor needed to advance scientific research, I believe that—in the
spirit of Elizabeth Costello—we have much to gain by challenging our scientific
concepts in cognitive science and artificial intelligence by confronting
them with the human experience that normal usage enshrines. As those
familiar with the OED know, each word comes with its etymology and with
a range of definitions and relevant historical quotations. What follows is an
edited and no doubt biased sampling that may be useful for systematizing
what has been learned in this volume. 2
Emotion: 4b. Psychology. A mental “feeling” or “affection” (e.g. of
pleasure or pain, desire or aversion, surprise, hope or fear, etc.), as
distinguished from cognitive or volitional states of consciousness.
Motivation: b. orig. Psychol. The (conscious or unconscious) stimulus
for action towards a desired goal, esp. as resulting from psychological
or social factors; the factors giving purpose or direction to
human or animal behaviour.
Affect: I. Mental. 1. a. The way in which one is affected or disposed;
mental state, mood, feeling, desire, intention. esp. b. Inward disposition,
feeling, as contrasted with external manifestation or action;
intent, intention, earnest, reality. c. Feeling, desire, or appetite, as
opposed to reason; passion, lust, evil-desire.
On the basis of these definitions, I see a spectrum from motivation and
affect, which dispose one to act in a certain way, to emotion, which is linked
to conscious feelings of “pleasure or pain, desire or aversion, surprise, hope
or fear, etc.” Thus, where Fellous and LeDoux (Chapter 4), for example,
are comfortable speaking of “emotional behavior” that may be unaccompanied
by “emotional feelings,” I usually regard this as “motivated behavior”
and reserve the term emotion for cases in which “feelings” are involved. However,
I think most authors in this volume would agree that emotional feelings
cannot so easily be “distinguished from cognitive or volitional states of
consciousness,” as the above definition assumes. Alas, the above is the beginning
of clarity, not its achievement. One can have emotion without feeling
the emotion—as in “I didn’t know I was angry until I over-reacted like
that”—and one can certainly have feelings—as in “I feel that the color does