Who Needs Emotions? The Brain Meets the Robot

354 conclusions
pathway of much more general capability, able to recognize objects and relationships
in a fashion that enables the prefrontal cortex to support the
planning of action, thus determining which affordances to exploit in the
current situation. The mirror-system hypothesis suggests how the recognition
of manual actions might have paved the way for cumulative evolutionary
changes in body and brain to yield early humans with the capability for
complex imitation, protosign, and protospeech.
I would argue that we are conscious in a fully human sense only because
we have language—i.e., that as awareness piggybacks on all manner of neural
functions, so too must it piggyback on language, thus reaching a subtlety
and complexity that would otherwise be impossible. However, I strongly
deny that consciousness is merely a function of language. For example, one
can be aware of the shape and shading and coloration of a face in great subtlety
and be totally unable to put one’s vivid, conscious perception of that face
into words. Moreover, I view consciousness as a system function that involves
networks including, but not necessarily limited to, the cerebral cortex and
that as the cerebral cortex evolves, so too does consciousness.
Arbib and Hesse (1986; Arbib, 1985) suggest that the key transition from
the limited set of vocalizations used in communication by, say, vervet monkeys
to the richness of human language came with a migration in time from
an execution/observation matching system, enabling an individual to recognize
the action (as distinct from the mere movement) that another individual
is making, to the individual becoming able to pantomime “this is the action
I am about to take” (see Arbib, 2001, for an exposition of the Arbib-Hesse
theory within the mirror-system framework.) Arbib and Hesse emphasize
the changes within the individual brain made possible by the availability of
a “précis”—a gesturable representation—of intended future movements (as
distinct from current movements). They use the term communication plexus
for the circuits involved in generating this representation. The Jacksonian
element of their analysis is that the evolution of the communication plexus
provides an environment for the further evolution of older systems. They
suggest that once the brain has such a communication plexus, a new process
of evolution begins whereby the précis comes to serve not only as a basis for
communication between the members of a group but also as a resource for
planning and coordination within the brain itself. This communication plexus
thus evolves a crucial role in schema coordination. The thesis is that it is the
activity of this coevolved process that constitutes consciousness. As such, it
will progress in richness along with the increased richness of communication
that culminates as language in the human line. Since lower-level schema
activity can often proceed successfully without this highest-level coordination,
consciousness may sometimes be active, if active at all, as a monitor