Witti-Buch2 2001.qxd - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

Matteo Negro
metaphysical or phycological level, but in its spontaneity it reveals its intimate essence
that conforms to a use and meaning in act.
"45. Das Wesen des Rechnens haben wir beim Rechnenlernen kennengelernt.
[…] 47. So rechnet man. Und Rechnen ist dies. Das, was wir z.B. in der Schule
lernen. Vergiß diese tranzendente Sicherheit, die mit deinem Begriff des Geistes
zusammenhängt" (1990, 129).
Individual and social action is already the carrier of meaning and the certainty of
thinking or action has its function in that spontaneity and not within an abstact sphere of
life which the belief system does not presuppose.
Even the obligation of an action is rendered comprehensible and, in the final
analysis, sharable on the basis of a shared spontaneous certainty1 . This is therefore the
real beginning of an epistemic justification. It is a beginning which is not empirical but
rather tied to ordinary linguistic experience that commonsense records2 .
II) The ordinary is a linguistic certainty. A reflection, and therefore a conceptual and
linguistic schema on the ordinary which, if not rooted in the forms of life, risks falling into
the trap of negative cognitive metaphysics3 . Language defines itself as a totality of
judgements (1990, 164: "Das, woran ich festhalte, ist nicht ein Satz, sondern ein Netz
von Sätzen") that obtain their meaning from the modality of their use, that is from the
modality of the application of a rule.
"61…Eine Bedeutung eines Wortes ist eine Art seiner Verwendung. Denn sie ist
das, was wir erlernen, wenn das Wort zuerst unserer Sprache einverleibt wird.
62. Darum besteht eine Entsprechung zwischen den Begriffen "Bedeutung" und
"Regel". […] 140. Wir lernen die Praxis des empirischen Urteilens nicht, indem
wir Regeln lernen; es werden uns Urteile beigebracht und ihr Zusammenhang
mit andern Urteilen. Ein Ganzes von Urteilen wird uns plausibel gemacht" (1990,
132 and 149).
III) The ordinary is a logical certainty. There are two aspects to be underlined in this
regard. On one hand, by logic is intended the description of the language game(1990,
131: "zur Logik gehört alles, was ein Sprachspiel beschreibt"). The language game,
which distinguishes between the expression of ordinary experience, almost inevitably
reveals its congruence with a system of rules. The propositions of experience are in fact
logical propositions4 . The logic of ordinary language does not correspond to a deductive
system of propositions. One might suggest, however, and this is the second aspect, that
language, rather than suggesting deductions, continually suggests hypotheses and
expectations. The certainty of ordinary experience makes any other possibility
reasonable and therefore logical5 .
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