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Witti-Buch2 2001.qxd - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

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Finitism and Symmetry<br />

Jonas Larsson<br />

The Strong Programme of the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge is more often than not<br />

discussed on the basis of its four methodological theses: causality, impartiality,<br />

symmetry and reflexivity. However, a closer reading of the works of David Bloor and<br />

Barry Barnes displays the significance of the hitherto much neglected thesis of finitism.<br />

These advocates of the Strong Programme are interested in finitism, which primarily is<br />

a thesis in the philosophy of language, because of its significance for the sociology of<br />

knowledge. The present paper investigates the significance of finitism with respect to<br />

concept application. It is fruitful to begin by examining Bloor's critique of rationalism.<br />

Bloor on Rationalism<br />

According to Bloor's paper Rationalism, Supernaturalism and the Sociology of<br />

Knowledge, the main problem with rationalism is its false belief that rules or concepts<br />

can be assigned explanatory status:<br />

Rationalism seems plausible because we think that rules and meanings furnish<br />

us with invisible rails which reach ahead of behaviour, giving guidance to those<br />

rational enough to intuit their presence. But we cannot make concepts or rules<br />

explain the activity of concept or rule users. It is the activity of the users, their<br />

habits and goals, which explain why a concept or rule is applied in the way it is.<br />

(1988: 69)<br />

In order to understand why the explanatory status of rules and concepts are of<br />

importance to the Strong Programme, the asymmetry of rationalism must be taken into<br />

account. Think for example about rational explanations of theory choice. Rationalists<br />

commonly assume that a scientist, in so far as s/he intends to choose the<br />

epistemologically superior theory, acts in accordance with the acknowledged principles<br />

of comparison and the available data and thereby makes correct judgements (with<br />

respect to the epistemic merits of the competing theories). One the other hand, if the<br />

scientist does intend to choose the superior theory but acts contrary to the principles of<br />

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