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Witti-Buch2 2001.qxd - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

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Jonas Larsson<br />

comparison, then some non-rational factors, such as psycho-sociological factors, are<br />

assumed to override her/his predisposition to judge correctly, i.e. in compliance with the<br />

rule. Hence, given the pursuit of the epistemologically superior theory, rationalists<br />

conclude that psychological and sociological explanations are appropriate only when the<br />

relevant principles of comparison are applied wrongly (Newton-Smith 1981). At stake in<br />

Bloor's critique of rationalism is whether the rationalists can uphold their asymmetrical<br />

styles of explanation. The symmetry requirement, proposed by the Strong Programme,<br />

states that the sociologists should provide social explanations of actions, judgements,<br />

beliefs and inferences independently of whether the actions are rational or irrational, of<br />

whether the judgements and beliefs are true or false, or of whether the inferences are<br />

valid or invalid (Bloor 1991). I shall begin my investigation of finitism and its significance<br />

for a sociological understanding of concept application by explaining why Bloor rejects<br />

explanations based on rules and concepts.<br />

Finitism and Determinism<br />

One way to approach fundamental questions about meaning, favoured by the advocates<br />

of finitism, is to ask what determines the proper usage of an empirical term. According<br />

to Barnes, Bloor and Henry, all that finitism insists upon is that neither the meaning of a<br />

term nor the way it has been previously used or defined will fix its future proper usage<br />

(1996: 78). Put differently, finitism denies that an empirical term comes with a standard<br />

of correctness that fixes reference independently of its application. Its oppositedeterminism<br />

-maintains the converse view: that there are use-independent standards<br />

that determine reference. Let me now explain how Bloor's rejection of rational<br />

explanations is related to the thesis of finitism.<br />

There are two conditions-one subjective and one objective-that must be fulfilled if<br />

determinism is to be maintained. The objective condition states that whatever<br />

determines the future proper use of an empirical term must fix a conceptual constraint<br />

that applies in an indefinite number of cases. The subjective condition states that<br />

whatever is supposed to determine the future proper use of an empirical term must be<br />

something to which beings with finite capacities can conform.<br />

Now, assume in line with determinism that there is a standard of correctness related<br />

to an empirical term that fixes a conceptual constraint to which finite beings can conform.<br />

On the basis of these assumptions one might explain why an individual applies an<br />

empirical term correctly by saying that s/he perceived the import of the conceptual<br />

constraint and applied the term accordingly. However, the advocates of finitism argue<br />

that the objective and the subjective condition cannot both be satisfied. The argument is<br />

14

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