Witti-Buch2 2001.qxd - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

Jimmy Plourde
(iii) A state of affairs is a concrete combination of simple objects (in the
atomic case).
On the basis of these three theses, we can formulate the following argument:
P1 All meaningful propositions represent a possible state of affairs
such that if the proposition p is meaningful, then there is a state of affairs S
which is represented by the proposition p (theses (i) and (ii)).
P2 False propositions represent non subsisting states of affairs.
C1 There are possible states of affairs which do not subsist in the
actual world but which are nonetheless represented by meaningful propositions.
These states of affairs are merely possible.
P3 On the ontological level, merely possible states of affairs are either
abstract entities representing a genuine possibility of combination of simple
objects (actualist interpretation) or pure fictions (naturalist actualist
interpretation) or, else, possible entities not subsisting in the actual world but
subsisting in another possible world (possibilist interpretation).
P4 Since states of affairs are concrete entities (iii), merely possible
states of affairs cannot be abstract entities such as those postulated by the
actualists or ersatzists in order to provide an account of the modalities.
P5 Given the fact that Wittgenstein does not talk about subsisting
states of affairs on the one hand and fictious states of affairs on the other hand,
merely possible states of affairs cannot be considered as fictious entities. There
is no talk nor any account of fictious states of affairs in the Tractatus.
C2 Therefore, what false propositions represent, the merely possible
states of affairs, are concrete and possible entities which do not subsist in the
actual world but do subsist nonetheless. And this is the kind of entity possibilists
call a possibilia and the admission of which commits one to possibilism.
In the literature on the Tractatus, Stenius, Simons and Carruthers hold or have held
at some times theses (i), (ii) and (iii) or theses very close to these. Simons held, for
instance, theses (i) and (ii) in his excellent paper on what he called the ‘Old problem of
complex and fact’ where he writes:
188
Why does Wittgenstein need Sachverhalte? Because every sentence with
sense represents something, but not every proposition is true. Only the true
ones correspond to facts. What an elementary proposition represents cannot be