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Witti-Buch2 2001.qxd - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

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Is Logic Syntax of Language?<br />

Carnap's Programme, Gödel's Critique,<br />

and <strong>Wittgenstein</strong>'s Evasion<br />

Brian David Mogck<br />

The purpose of this paper is to show that <strong>Wittgenstein</strong> developed a theory of logical<br />

syntax that is in several important respects identical to Carnap's. Gödel's criticism of<br />

Carnap's project (bearing on consistency) is considered. It is then shown how<br />

<strong>Wittgenstein</strong>'s logical syntax avoids this criticism. In conclusion, it is suggested in<br />

response to Gödel's criticism that logical syntax aims at descriptive, not semantical<br />

completeness.<br />

1. Logical Syntax in Carnap and <strong>Wittgenstein</strong><br />

It has not widely been appreciated that <strong>Wittgenstein</strong>'s middle-period logical theory was<br />

in substantial agreement with Carnap's logical syntax. 1 <strong>Wittgenstein</strong>, in a discussion with<br />

members of the Vienna Circle circa 1930, states that "[p]hilosophy is the clarification of<br />

the syntax of language." 2 This is four years before Carnap completed his Logical Syntax<br />

of Language. In fact, Carnap wrote to Neurath on December 23, 1933, "My syntax<br />

historically has two roots: the first is <strong>Wittgenstein</strong>, the second is metamathematics." 3<br />

Four theses define the core of this syntax.<br />

1.1 Logic is a Formal Study of Linguistic Structures<br />

This thesis amounts to holding that logical properties and relations are properties<br />

and relations of signs and not of their meanings. These properties and relations are<br />

known a priori by considering the formal structure of sentences, that is, how they are<br />

legitimately formed and transformed. For Carnap, "[i]t was <strong>Wittgenstein</strong> who first<br />

exhibited the close connection between the logic of science (or 'philosophy, as he calls<br />

it) and syntax. In particular he made clear the formal nature of logic and emphasized<br />

the fact that the rules and proofs of syntax should have no reference to the meaning of<br />

symbols." (LSL, p. 282)<br />

A likely source for this view is TLP 3.33: "In logical syntax the meaning of a sign<br />

should never play a rôle. It must be possible to establish logical syntax without<br />

mentioning the meaning of a sign; only the description of expressions may be<br />

presupposed." (Cf. 4.1213) In fact, for <strong>Wittgenstein</strong> the whole philosophy logic is<br />

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