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Witti-Buch2 2001.qxd - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

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Is <strong>Wittgenstein</strong> a Possibilist?<br />

a positive atomic fact, as I have used this term, for then all elementary<br />

propositions would be true. So <strong>Wittgenstein</strong> needs what in Meinongian terms we<br />

can call a watered-down fact (cf. BB 35-6 on “Shadows of facts”) which a<br />

proposition can represent irrespective of its truth-value. In the Tractatus this role<br />

is played by the Sachlage or situation (2.11, 2.202), and in the special positive<br />

atomic case <strong>Wittgenstein</strong> uses the special term ‘Sachverhalt’. (P.M. Simons,<br />

1992(1985), p. 334)<br />

As to the nature of this “watered-down fact”, Simons does not tell us anything here.<br />

But since he conceives of states of affairs as complexes of simple objects and, therefore,<br />

admits the thesis (iii), his interpretation commits <strong>Wittgenstein</strong> to possibilism1 .<br />

3. Critique of the argument<br />

But does the picture theory really commit <strong>Wittgenstein</strong> to the existence of nonactual<br />

possible states of affairs? I think not. In fact, for reasons I am not going to present here<br />

today, I think that <strong>Wittgenstein</strong> is much closer to an anti-possibilist position in the<br />

Tractatus than to a possibilist interpretation2 . Thus, at least one of the three theses above<br />

from which we came to the conclusion that <strong>Wittgenstein</strong> would be a possibilist must be<br />

wrong. But which one(s)?<br />

Thesis (iii) seems to me quite obvious. That states of affairs must be conceived as<br />

some kind of structured concrete entities follows straightforwardly from the following<br />

remarks:<br />

2.01 Der Sachverhalt ist eine Verbindung von Gegenständen. (Sachen, Dingen)<br />

2.03 Im Sachverhalt hängen die Gegenstände ineinander, wie die Glieder einer<br />

Kette.<br />

2.031 Im Sachverhalt verhalten sich die Gegenstände in bestimmter Art und<br />

Weise zueinander.<br />

We do find in the Tractatus some evidences for the thesis (i) as well. The most<br />

speaking one is the following:<br />

2.22 Das Bild stellt dar, was es darstellt, unabhängig von seiner Wahr- oder<br />

Falschheit, durch die Form der Abbildung.<br />

The only question which remains here however problematic is the question of the<br />

nature and force of “darstellen”. In the thesis quoted above, it is taken to be some kind<br />

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