Witti-Buch2 2001.qxd - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

Wittgenstein's Legacy for the Self
Being moved by a person seems to be crucial here. The combination of the "third person
perspective" with authenticity thus generates a challenging legacy for the self.
2. The price for Wittgensteinian certainty: Unavoidable or
problematical
Wittgenstein made it abundantly clear that following a rule is not just about mimicking a
particular behaviour from one situation to another. Though we follow rules blindly, they
cannot be fully made explicit; it is always necessary to take into account all the elements
of the new situation one finds oneself in, which implies, among other things,
communication and dialogue. One can only be certain of the frame of reference itself;
this is part of the life we have inherited, not the result of systematic (rational) teaching
and not changeable on the basis of rational arguments. Understandably this has led to
criticism. Yet, it seems so different from everything we know about Wittgenstein's own
intuitions, of his personal philosophical intentions. Though it is certainly wrongheaded to
look for an ultimate justification, it can be asked whether there is not something more
possible than a resignation to "how things are".
For instance, do we have to accept a form of life fully in order to understand it? And
is it correct that one cannot distance oneself from it without necessarily ending up in
(logical) circularity? And is this crucial basic notion still able to express the basis of the
presentday individualistic kind of culture we are living? Indeed, we live in a time where
a (sub-)culture can be rejected in ways which were not conceivable before-though this
may not imply that one has to give up social embeddedness, nor the third person
perspective, nor the role of the others or the horizon of meaning, at least not necessarily.
For Wittgenstein another basic concept is "trust" and not "rights"-the latter carries with it
associations with opposition and with rivalry. But it can be questioned whether both of
these basic notions are able to tell the full story. Of course, what a human being is
cannot be invented ex nihilo, but belongs to a human history. And because of that,
particular questions are evidently asked which also determine the criteria of the answers
that can be given, the solutions that are acceptable, and thus the issues that are allowed
to disappear, at which point one can stop doing philosophy. But it remains possible to
think (i.e. more than just imagine), that it could have been different, even when one
makes (necessarily) use of the fragments of the past, as well as taking into account
"what is justified for us". At a more individual level, the concept of "integrity" seems of
the utmost importance in the Wittgensteinian frame of reference: a person who is in
harmony with herself and who will stand up for herself, making clear what she is willing
to identify herself with, as it reflects what is of the utmost importance for her, what makes
life worthwhile. But Wittgenstein does not elaborate further as to how this individual and
her integrity should be conceived.
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