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Witti-Buch2 2001.qxd - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

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Is <strong>Wittgenstein</strong> a Possibilist?<br />

failed to acknowledge the distinction <strong>Wittgenstein</strong> draws between “das Bestehen” and<br />

“ein bestehender”. Along with Simons 1985, I think that <strong>Wittgenstein</strong> meant something<br />

different when he used bestehen in the substantive form than when he did when he used<br />

it as an adjective. Das Bestehen eines Sachverhaltes is not a bestehender Sachverhalt.<br />

A bestehender Sachverhalt is a complex. It is an entity which consists of objects<br />

combined in a specific manner. Either it exists or it doesn’t. Das Bestehen eines<br />

Sachverhaltes is what is the case when the Sachverhalt exists. Das Nichtbestehen is<br />

what is the case when the Sachverhalt doesn’t exist. In the first case, I have a positive<br />

fact, in the second I have a negative fact. As Simons pointed out and as it stands in the<br />

Tractatus (2.06), only facts are said in the Tractatus to be positive and negative. To talk<br />

about concrete entities such as states of affairs as being the case simply doesn’t make<br />

sense. The second reason is that there is a curious unanimity in the literature in saying<br />

without relying on any strong evidence for that claim that a Sachlage is some kind of a<br />

nonatomic Sachverhalt. Given 2.201 and 2.202 quoted above, and given 2.11 as well, it<br />

is however obvious that, once the distinction between “das Bestehen” and “bestehender”<br />

has been acknowledged, a Sachlage may no longer be considered as some kind of a<br />

nonatomic concrete entity.<br />

4. Concluding remarks<br />

How does the fact that what a proposition represents isn’t a state of affairs refute the<br />

thesis that <strong>Wittgenstein</strong> is a possibilist? The point here is the following. Despite the fact<br />

that propositions do represent entities independently of what is the case, the entities<br />

depicted, the situations, are not, like possibilia, things that may exist in the actual world.<br />

They are just possibilities of obtaining of states of affairs and not these obtaining of<br />

states of affairs. i.e. not the fact that the states of affairs do not obtain, nor the states<br />

affairs themselves. Moreover, the idea that represented situations are not platonic<br />

entities but constructed entities makes them closer to the abstract entities and worlds<br />

postulated by the ersatzists than to the possibilist’s possibilia.<br />

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