Witti-Buch2 2001.qxd - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

Wittgenstein's Legacy for the Self
coherence, in other words how we, with all our wishes and anxieties, are present in our
conceptual performances. Similarly, Cavell urges us not to attempt to escape the
conditions we find ourselves in by taking revenge on existence, but instead wills us to
continue to be born, to be natal, hence mortal (Cavell, 1988).
To describe the relation between my sensations and public objects is not easy, when
my sensations are both grammatically mine and yet objets of conceptual consciousness
for me only insofar as I engage with public criteria, techniques, and practices, indeed
talking of something unique with me that I mean or refer to leads nowhere. Not
withstanding the importance of training, something is left to me to do. When I call
something "something", either to myself or to others, what I do is the result of the
inextricable interfusion of inner and outer, of natural power and public practice, of nature
and convention, together with all the temptations, wishes, fantasies, and anxieties about
otherness involved in coming to be an articulate conceptualizer only within that
interfusion. Clearly, Wittgenstein refuses to take a stance in the debate concerning either
the public or the private, between what something "means" and to what it comes down
to "for me". Philosophy will have to focus on "working on the self". This directs us to
Emersonian perfectionism; at the same time he cautions us that the possibilities of
distancing oneself-even becoming fully conscious of-either from our inherited cultural
practices and ways of living together, or from the way one is (nature or character), are
limited.
By doing philosophy, Wittgenstein sought to exorcize his demons. He held the
opinion that the mark of a certain character lies not in the profession of a set of beliefs,
but in living a certain way. Therefore, the terms on which moral philosophers concentrate
are not the ones that characteristically occur in moral discussions, and furthermore, that
human beings are so diverse, and the complexities of the human condition so rich, that
no set of general principles could possibly serve as a guide to conduct. He also therefore
holds that: "Working in philosophy ... is really more a working on oneself. On one's own
interpretation. On one's way of seeing things. (And what one expects of them.)" (CV,
p.16e) In philosophy it is matter of learning to live better, more decently, of recognizing
and fulfilling one's duties to oneself and to others. And of a present-day teacher of
philosophy he says that he does not select food for his pupil with the aim of flattering his
taste, but with the aim of changing it. (CV, 17e). In a letter to Norman Malcolm he writes:
... what is the use of studying philosophy if all that it does for you is to enable
you to talk with some plausibility about some abstruse questions of logic, etc., &
if it does not improve your thinking about the important questions of everyday
life, ... You see, I know that it's difficult to think well about "certainty", "probability"
"perception" etc. But it is, if possible, still more difficult to think, or try to think,
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