Witti-Buch2 2001.qxd - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

David Pérez Chico & Moisés Barroso Ramos
References
Bouveresse, J. (1976), Le mythe de l'intériorité. Expérience, signification et langage
privé chez Wittgenstein, Paris: Minuit. 1987.
Cavell, S. (1979), The Claim of Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Honneth, A. (1992): The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social
Conflicts, Polity Press, 1996
Wittgenstein, L. (1958), Philosophical Investigations, London: Basil Blackwell.
Endnote
1 We are referring to Wittgenstein's well-known remarks that in the Philosophical
Investigations start after his considerations on following a rule.
2 This is what Cavell calls the "truth of skepticism". On one hand, our srelationship
with the external world would be one of acceptance, as if our believes could never
be confirmed definitively (Cavell, 243). On the other hand, in our relationship with
others we acknowledge something that we, in a sense, we already know.
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