Witti-Buch2 2001.qxd - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

Logic vs. Information - Two Approaches To Language
precise certain meanings, but basing on my former symbolic constructs. Even if
semantic concretisation is not precise, information transfer is still possible thanks to
common cultural symbols. Without such understanding no theory construction would be
possible. In the first heuristic stage, no theoretical concepts are defined, but information
exchange and selection takes place. In fact it even grows.
Metaphysical information filtering hardly can be taken psychologically. The
dominating metaphysics is rather inter-subjective belief of the majority. This belief is
however based on pragmatism. Metaphysical hypotheses cannot be directly verified or
falsified. As long as certain metaphysical beliefs are sufficient to explain the universe,
they remain mostly unquestioned. The metaphysical concepts other than the leading
one become “outsiders” and never are taken seriously. When, theoretical models based
on the dominating belief stop working, the “outsiders” get “green lights”. The competition
is won by only one of such concepts; the best adopted to empirical data as well as
coherent to other existing and correctly functioning theories. It is quite similar to natural
selection in neo-Darwinian evolution theory.
The common feature of “information filtering” is that it is contextual. We assert the
value of truth to experimental reports in the context of the positivistic rule - trust in
experimental testing is the best we have, though we cannot prove that experiments have
anything to do with the real world.
We accept thought experiments confronting it with the logical context of the
statements forming the theory.
We distinguish between the rhetorical questions and information seeking within the
context of the grammatical structure of the question.
The next example will show how we use information “filtering” in the case of liar’s
paradox.
5. The Liar and his Statement.
The liar paradox usually can be presented in many forms. We shall use the simplest one,
which goes as follows:
X comes to us and says: “I am a liar”
The standard logical problem results from the question whether the “liar’s” statement
is false or true. Whichever value would we assign to that statement, it could be
preserved only providing that the statement has the logical value opposite to the one
assigned.
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