Witti-Buch2 2001.qxd - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

Jacob Joshua Ross
6. Blackburn's "quasi-realism" and his interpretation of LW's irrealism seem to reflect a
determination to insist that other communicative functions are secondary in
importance to linguistic "description", as may be evidenced by the fact that we are
ready to give all forms of discourse a "proposition surface". But this evidence is not
sufficient. The tendency may exist, but indicates nothing regarding the priority of
description. So we may better advised to avoid so slippery a position as "quasirealism"
as a categorization of ethical discourse. This would be more in keeping with
LW's "language-games" position.
7. It is this multi-functionalism of language that LW himself is suggesting when, in his
later view, he interprets religion and religious discourse as a particular way of life in
which there is a language-game. The interpretation of his views by Phillips and Don
Cuppit to liberalize "modern religion" and free it as much as possible from
supernaturalism is an unnecessary accretion that these WNS have added to LW's
own views. As Scott correctly opines, there was no intention in LW's later views to
reduce or minimalize religious claims in any way. He simply tried to show how the
language in this field was different from its usage in suggesting scientific
hypotheses. While he himself tended to minimalize and reduce religion in his early
period, I believe that in his later period he was much more ready to leave things as
they are, merely trying to understand as much as possible what are the factors
involved in this particular language-game. (This explains LC pp. 70-71)
8. Scott's two alternative interpretations of LW's views on religion - non-factual
(expressivist) versus minimal realist - are not mutually exclusive. Lovibond is right
to point out that LW's later work offers "a homogenous or seamless concept of
language." It is precisely for this reason that (contra Blackburn) in trying to
understand the differences between different language-games, we have to point out
the differences in usage as well as the similarities.
9. The criticism of the WNS theories of Phillips and Cuppit as "fideist" was never more
than a half-truth. LW himself certainly appreciated the value of religion but did not
regard the established religions as sacrosanct and self-justifying. Hence the idea
that the "fideist" criticism and the "repackaged non-cognitivism" crticism parallel the
two interpretations and cannot be reconciled is simply not true. Neither criticism is
right, and LW's view of religion consists of pointing out both "expressivist" and "truthaptness"
factors in the religious language-game.
10. The anthropological/theological theories of Clifford Geertz and George Lindbeck are
based on much sounder readings of the views of the later Wittgenstein on religion
than the facile discussions by the philosophers (Blackburn, Scott,etc.) of LW's views
in terms of realism versus non-realism. The latter fail to explain the significance of
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