2003 IMTA Proceedings - International Military Testing Association

Strategies for Increased Reporting of Security-Relevant Behavior*
Kent S. Crawford
Defense Personnel Security Research Center
Suzanne Wood
Consultant to Northrop Grumman Mission Systems
Introduction
United States federal policies and those of the Department of Defense (DoD) are
designed to ensure that the cleared workforce is reliable, trustworthy, and loyal. One of
the requirements of such policies is that supervisors and coworkers who work in
classified environments report to security managers any behavior they observe among
workplace colleagues that may be of security concern. In essence, supervisors and
coworkers, working closely with each other as they do, can observe or become aware of
behaviors that might suggest a risk to national security.
These policy requirements are in place as one means to prevent Americans from
committing espionage. However, espionage is a rare event. One is not likely ever to
encounter a spy, much less observe an act of espionage. So while catching spies may be
an ultimate goal for these policies and the reason to report counterintelligence- (CI) and
security-related behavior, the policies are also designed to regularly evaluate the millions
of ordinary people in the workplace who have access to classified information, people
who have no intention of committing espionage but are likely—over a period of time or
in changing contexts—to develop personal problems that may possibly question their
reliability and trustworthiness. The philosophy behind policies nowadays is that the
government is not just trying to root out spies: by asking employees to report, the
government is not only identifying potential security risks but actually helping employees
take care of the kinds of human problems that plague us all from time to time. However,
reporting policy—based on the adjudicative guidelines—has mixed together the kinds of
behavior that should always be reported. CI- and security-related behaviors are mixed
with reliability and suitability problems. This has led to confusion among supervisors and
coworkers about what behaviors are the most important to report. It is this confusion that
often paralyses employees: if they are not sure exactly what to report, they simply report
nothing.
Evidence gathered during a recent PERSEREC study (Wood & Marshall-Mies,
2003) shows that the reporting rate is in fact very low. Supervisors and coworkers are
reluctant to inform security managers about many behaviors that they observe in the
workplace because they believe them to be too personal to report. It is ironic that the very
behaviors that the government wants people to report—in order to be able to help them—
are the very ones that supervisors and coworkers are loath to share with authorities.
Employees are, however, more willing to report behaviors that are egregious and appear
to have a more direct some connection with national security.
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*The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect
those of the United States Department of Defense.
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45 th Annual Conference of the International Military Testing Association
Pensacola, Florida, 3-6 November 2003