2003 IMTA Proceedings - International Military Testing Association

588
To plan for future missions properly the commander needs to know the number of
soldiers he will have and the skills they possess. This concept is called manning and is one of
the most critical elements of war. The ultimate aim of a replacement system is to continue to
man the force. The procedures used to achieve this aim have varied throughout history (FM
12-6, 1994).
Differing Operational Approaches
The German divisions during World War II (WW II) were affiliated with a
military district with the regiments within a division affiliated with a region within the
military district. Replacement battalions were located within a region intending to have
regimental replacements coming from the same German regions. This was very effective
during the early stages of the war, but as the number of German divisions grew it became
necessary to have replacement battalions provide replacements for divisions instead of
regiments. The replacement battalions received the draftees and provided about two
months of combat training, then after this initial training the replacements were either
sent to the division to a replacement battalion or to receive additional training.
The German division and regimental commanders were in charge of their
replacement system rather than the Army command. This decentralized system fostered
esprit de corps and great unit devotion, however, when certain units had mass casualties
they had to be taken off the front lines, since not enough replacements were available
from the affiliated region or military district. When this occurred the unit was sent to a
recovery area behind the front lines, remaining there until enough sick and wounded
soldiers returned or region and district draftees were assigned to the unit. Another
approach used by the Germans was to take the remnants of a division and create new
battalions. These battalions would then become part of another division, the regional
integrity of the battalions being kept intact. Along with reducing the numbers of
divisional battalions from the original nine to seven, these approaches allowed
Germany to maintain nearly 300 divisions until the later stages of WW II.
The British replacement system during WW II was similar to the German system
in that it tried to keep regional ties whenever possible. The U.S. Army took a differing, if
not opposite approach, to replacement operations, marking considerations as to how and
why another approach was more acceptable. There was fear that if a particular unit lost a
large number of men, it would have a dramatically negative impact on the regional
morale. Another difference in replacement philosophy was the decision to keep the
number of divisions relatively low. During WW II Henry L. Stimson, then Secretary of
War, wanted the Army to have 200 divisions, whereas General George C. Marshall, the
leading U.S. Army proponent, insisted on keeping the number much lower so that these
would be an adequate replacement flow. Secretary Stimson ultimately gave way to
General Marshall and they agreed that 90 divisions for the Army would be a manageable
number. It was also thought a centralized system would be more efficient and as needs
occur fill them quickly as possible without concern for trying to keep regional integrity.
45 th Annual Conference of the International Military Testing Association
Pensacola, Florida, 3-6 November 2003