2003 IMTA Proceedings - International Military Testing Association

590
pulse (EMP). Our reliance on technology will not diminish, therefore, it is imperative
that we have hardened systems with backup modules, computer firewalls, and antivirus
software.
The second problem facing the replacement system is the lack of reliable models for
casualty estimation and stratification. There is currently no validated computer simulations
model that generates casualties for Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS).
We are now a force projection Army and there is more reliance on CS and CSS than ever
before where our enemies are constantly striving to find ways to reduce our advantages by
disrupting CS and CSS. The emphasis the Center for Army Analysis (CAA) places on casualty
estimation and stratification for combat personnel must be applied to CS and CSS personnel.
Another short coming of casualty estimation is the restrictive nature of the
models. The models currently run simulations to estimate casualties only at the division
level or higher, yet our force is tending to get smaller, more lethal and more
maneuverable. As we have experienced in the 2003 Iraqi War, many battles will be
fought at the maneuver brigade level and below, requiring we must be able to estimate
casualties at those levels. Further current models do not have sufficient capability to
simulate weapons of mass destruction (WMD), operations other-than-war (OOTW) or
special operations and primarily concentrate only on conventional losses in conventional
operations. Since we live in an unpredictable world rather than conventional, casualty
estimation models must be flexible enough to allow planners the ability to simulate
casualties in many different environments.
The third problem now facing the Army's replacement system is the lack of
personnel with something less than 500,000 personnel on active duty. Congress has been
informed by the Department of Defense and senior Army leadership that everything is
fine, as this number is acceptable during a qualified enforcing of "peacetime." However,
getting into a protracted conflict or in two nearly simultaneous theaters of war there are
currently insufficient personnel. It would then be necessary to activate the reserve
components where we have over half of our combat forces. Fully activating the National
Guard and Army Reserve would require the President to convince Congress and the
American people that our way of life and security are drastically threatened. This
problem actually goes beyond current numbers as presented below in Table 1. If
Congress directed the Army to set peacetime active duty numbers at 700,000 personnel,
the Army would likely fall short since present recruiting goals are barely met (Arlington,
1998).
Table 1
U.S. Army Total Force 2004
Active Component (AC) Army National Guard (ANG) Army Reserve (AR)
480,000 + 350,000 + 205,000 =
(Force Structure 1,035,000)*
*Army Divisions 18 (10AC, 8 ARNG)
45 th Annual Conference of the International Military Testing Association
Pensacola, Florida, 3-6 November 2003