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Reaching the marginalized: EFA global monitoring report, 2010; 2010

Reaching the marginalized: EFA global monitoring report, 2010; 2010

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010CHAPTER 32Education for All Global Monitoring ReportWell-designedschool feedingprogrammescan providesignificantnutritional andeducationalbenefitsBox 3.23: Ethiopia — Productive Safety Net Programme boosts children’s educationEthiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme is <strong>the</strong>largest social protection programme in sub-SaharanAfrica outside South Africa. Launched in January2005, <strong>the</strong> Productive Safety Net Programme nowprovides regular cash or food transfers to more than7 million people whose food sources are unreliable.It has produced significant benefits for education.The programme aims to protect highly vulnerablepeople against shocks and to build <strong>the</strong>ir assets.During periods of stress, one adult per household isguaranteed <strong>the</strong> option of working in an employmentprogramme that provides payment in cash or in kindas food. In effect, <strong>the</strong> programme is a social insurancemechanism. It offers people a chance to manage riskwithout having to sell productive assets, cut spendingon nutrition or take children out of school. It hasbenefits affecting education at various levels:Children’s participation in education. Data for2006 indicate that about 15% of cash from <strong>the</strong>programme was used for education purposes.By 2008, spending on education was <strong>the</strong> mostcommon type of investment of programmeresources. Financial support has enabled manyfamilies to deal with shocks without taking childrenout of school. Half of <strong>the</strong> households interviewedin 2006 <strong>report</strong>ed keeping <strong>the</strong>ir children in schoollonger ra<strong>the</strong>r than withdrawing <strong>the</strong>m when cashor food was short; and one-third enrolled moreof <strong>the</strong>ir children in school. The benefits werestrongest in districts where transfers were incash ra<strong>the</strong>r than food.Unconditional transfers can also generate strongbenefits. In Zambia, a pilot unconditional cashtransfer programme supported by German aidinvolved two districts, Kalomo and Kazungula,marked by large out-of-school populations andhigh levels of poverty. It resulted in significantdeclines in absenteeism among children from poorhouseholds in Kalomo and an increase in spendingon education in both districts (UnderstandingChildren’s Work, 2009). Thus, social protectioncan have an effect even in countries unable toimplement and monitor conditional transfers.School feeding programmes provide ano<strong>the</strong>r formof social protection. The World Food Programmeestimates that 59 million primary students attendschool in a state of malnutrition, with 23 millionof <strong>the</strong>m in sub-Saharan Africa alone (World FoodProgramme, 2009). Well-designed school feedingprogrammes that include micronutrient fortificationClassroom construction. The public workscomponent of <strong>the</strong> programme has includedclassroom construction and upgrading of schools.In some villages, construction of classrooms hasallowed schools to add a grade, enabling pupils tostay on for ano<strong>the</strong>r year and reducing <strong>the</strong> attritionassociated with transition to more distant schools.Health and nutrition. Almost a third of recipientsspend cash from <strong>the</strong> programme on health servicesand <strong>the</strong> public works component has helped buildlocal clinics. The programme bolsters health andnutrition — receiving a relatively high transferfrom <strong>the</strong> programme reduces <strong>the</strong> likelihood oflow calorific intake by over ten percentage points.Set against <strong>the</strong>se positive outcomes are someimplementation problems. Employment-based supportcan create incentives for child labour. One study foundthat about 8% of workers in <strong>the</strong> programme wereunder 18. In families facing tight labour constraints,low transfers only partially alleviated resourceconstraints and in some cases pushed parents intocompensating for <strong>the</strong> transfer of <strong>the</strong>ir labour to <strong>the</strong>programme by increasing demands on young girls.An independent evaluation has concluded that <strong>the</strong>programme ‘could improve child schooling and reducechild labour provided that <strong>the</strong> transfers are largeenough’ (Hoddinott et al., 2009, p. 21).Sources: Devereux et al. (2006); Hoddinott (2008);Hoddinott et al. (2009); Sharp et al. (2006); Slater et al. (2006);Woldehanna (2009).and deworming provide significant nutritionalbenefits. They can increase school attendanceand educational achievement (Bundy et al., 2009b;Kristjansson et al., 2007; Miguel and Kremer, 2004).Many programmes incorporate a strong genderdimension by making special provision for girls’nutrition. One survey in sub-Saharan Africacovering 32 countries and 4,000 primary schoolsreceiving World Food Programme support foundthat school feeding had marked benefits on schoolparticipation (World Food Programme, 2007).What is less clear is <strong>the</strong> scale of <strong>the</strong> benefits and<strong>the</strong> most effective delivery mechanism. Schoolfeeding programmes raise many of <strong>the</strong> same issuesfor policy-makers as social protection in o<strong>the</strong>rareas. The key to success is equitably and costeffectivelydelivering an adequate incentive in termsof <strong>the</strong> amount of rations provided. There is someevidence that programmes combining take-home208

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