Reaching the marginalized: EFA global monitoring report, 2010; 2010

THE AID COMPACT: FALLING SHORT OF COMMITMENTSReforming the Fast Track Initiativesystems have often been deemed ineligible, evenwhen bilateral donors use them in harmonizedprogrammes. The result has been long-runningtension between FTI practices and the principlesunderpinning the Paris agenda.The FTI has the rhetoric of an aid partnershipwith the governance arrangements of a ‘donorclub’. Developing countries are underrepresentedat all levels of the FTI partnership.Governance arrangements are particularlyskewed at higher levels, where decisions aboutfunding allocations are made. In addition, FTIdecision-making processes are often arbitraryand opaque. New governance rules are neededto increase the voice of developing countries andthe transparency of decision-making. The FTIshould be reconstituted as an entity operatingindependently of the World Bank with a larger,more independent secretariat.Conflict-affected countries have not been wellserved by the FTI. The initiative is potentially aviable option for supporting countries affected byconflict as it provides a multilateral frameworkthat can help reduce risk and transaction costs.However, the FTI has not responded to the needsof conflict-affected countries. The frameworkis skewed towards rewarding governments ableto meet a ‘gold standard’ level of planning,effectively excluding many conflict-affectedcountries. The failure of the donor communityto develop a more flexible – and more relevant –model has seriously compromised the educationprospects of some of the world’s most vulnerablechildren. Extending the FTI to conflict-affectedcountries is among the most urgent of allreform priorities.Multilateral initiatives in public health providelessons for FTI reform. Global health initiativeshave played a vital role in mobilizing developmentfinance. In stark contrast to the FTI, programmessuch as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,Tuberculosis and Malaria and the GAVI Alliancehave also provided multilateral frameworks forchannelling additional private financing towardsshared international development goals andcreated democratic, transparent and accountablegovernance structures linking national planningprocesses to aid disbursements. Whilemultilateral initiatives in health are not withoutproblems and the education sector is differentin some key respects, FTI reform should reflectlessons from global health initiatives.Constructive debate on the FTI has been stymied bya protracted ‘blame game’. Donors have criticizedone another for perceived failures in financing anddelivery and the World Bank for wider governanceproblems. Unfortunately, the resulting dialogue hasdiverted attention from deeper structural problems.The FTI cannot be held responsible for donors’failure to act on pledges made at Dakar or fordeveloping countries’ failure to prioritize policiesfor overcoming marginalization. Weak politicalcommitment to international aid for education andto national equity has far deeper roots. Similarly,the highly professional FTI Secretariat in the WorldBank cannot be held responsible for governancerules created by the institution’s shareholders.While the governance architecture of the FTI isproblematic and has weakened its impact, failuresof governance are themselves a symptom of weakpolitical leadership.This section has five parts. Part 1 sets out thebackground to the FTI, explaining how it operatesand documenting delivery to date. Part 2 focuseson financing and the slow pace of disbursement.Part 3 looks at the failure of the FTI to respond tothe special needs of countries affected by conflict.Part 4 explores some of the major global initiativesin health, drawing lessons that may be relevantfor FTI reform. The section concludes by settingout some of the key conditions for a global initiativein education that can deliver results.The Fast Track Initiative frameworkLaunched in 2002, the Fast Track Initiative waspresented as part of a wider global compact forachieving international development goals. Atthe International Conference on Financing forDevelopment (Monterrey, 2002), developing countriescommitted to strengthen planning for povertyreduction, while rich countries pledged to mobilizemore aid to support ‘country-owned’ plans.The FTI became a prototype for the new model,seen as a vehicle for strengthening nationalplanning through development of broad-basededucation strategies that would be a focal pointfor donor coordination and resource mobilization.The initiative was geared towards achievinguniversal primary completion by 2015, ratherthan the much broader set of EFA objectivesset out in the Dakar Framework (Colcloughand Fennel, 2004; Rose, 2005; World Bank, 2002b).In reality, it has had no significant impact evenon this narrow goal.Extending the FTIto conflict-affectedcountries is amongthe most urgentof all reformpriorities249