Reaching the marginalized: EFA global monitoring report, 2010; 2010

THE AID COMPACT: FALLING SHORT OF COMMITMENTSReforming the Fast Track Initiativelack transparency and consistency. For example, inCambodia cost estimates for the national educationstrategy indicate that the country needs anadditional US$138 million a year to achievespecified EFA goals agreed with donors. The localdonor group decided, for reasons never madepublic, that only around one-third of that amountcould be used effectively. The funding requestsubmitted to the Catalytic Fund was reviseddownwards to reflect this assessment (FTISecretariat, 2007a). In Cameroon, a proposal toprovide funding for the total estimated financinggap of US$47 million was submitted to the CatalyticFund and the first tranche approved in 2007 (FTISecretariat, 2007a). Leaving aside issues specificto these two cases, the comparison illustrates thead hoc nature of FTI operations and the absence ofa strategic planning vision for achieving EFA goals.Differing views over the role of the FTI in financinghave been a source of controversy from the outset.Many developing countries and campaigningorganizations argued that a multilateral initiativeshould play a direct role in financing educationplans geared towards international developmentgoals (Rose, 2005; Watkins, 2000). The frameworkthat emerged reflected a less ambitious approach.It saw the FTI as providing an imprimatur fornational plans that would unlock additional supportfrom donors operating within developing countries(FTI Secretariat, 2004; Cambridge Education et al.,2009). The emphasis shifted when the multidonorCatalytic Fund was set up as a source of directfinance, initially as a transitional financingmechanism for countries lacking a critical donorbase. In 2007 its doors were opened to those withendorsed education plans and a financing gap(FTI Secretariat, 2007c).The creation of the Catalytic Fund added to theconfusion over the role of the FTI in financing.Potential aid recipients often saw the new fund asthe real core of the initiative. As a recent evaluationof Kenya’s recourse to the FTI puts it: ‘A strikingfeature of the Kenya case is that FTI is seen bylocal stakeholders predominantly as a directsource of funding’ (through the FTI Catalytic Fund)(Thomson et al., 2009, p. 83). That perspective iswidely shared in developing countries. The roleof the Catalytic Fund remains ambiguous,however, with some donors seeing it as apotentially important mechanism for mobilizingand delivering the resources needed to achieveEFA goals and others continuing to view it asa residual financing vehicle.That ambiguity is apparent in the debate overCatalytic Fund replenishment. The FTI Secretariatestimated that US$1.2 billion is needed over theeighteen months to 2010 to meet expected demand(FTI Task Team on Replenishment of the EFA FastTrack Initiative, 2009). Yet it is not clear whetherthis estimate reflects an assessment of nationalfinancing gaps in relation to universal primaryeducation and other goals, or an assessment ofwhat donors might be willing to allocate. Recentdonor discussions on proposals to create a ‘needsand performance framework’ for allocation ofCatalytic Fund resources have added to theconfusion. The aim of the framework is to setout a process and criteria for determining howto spread resources among endorsed countries(FTI Secretariat, 2009b). In effect, the framework isattempting to establish a basis for rationing withouthaving first established the precise purpose of theCatalytic Fund or its role in global EFA financing.The Catalytic Fund essentially has become a parallelaid programme supporting a wide range of primarilyproject-based activities, mainly dealing with schoolconstruction, textbook purchasing and distribution,and teacher training. In Madagascar, the fundprovided US$21 million from 2005 to 2008 to helpfinance recruitment and training of communityteachers. Support to Rwanda is providing capitationgrants to primary schools to help finance the costof phasing out user fees (World Bank, 2009h). Theseprogrammes are important, yet most FTI supportmirrors activities already backed by in-countrydonors, including those that finance the CatalyticFund. Another concern is the lack of provision forongoing funding to cover, for example, the risingrecurrent salary cost of increased teacher recruitment.More fundamentally, the FTI has failed to transformthe financing environment for aid to basic education.Accelerated progress towards education for allclearly requires strengthened national planning.But it also requires a commitment by donors toprovide predictable, long-term support – over fiveto ten years – including for teacher salaries. Foraid recipients, what matters is timely delivery ofdonor finance during planning and budget cycles.At present, the FTI neither assures mobilization ofadditional resources by bilateral donors operatingin-country nor offers a reliable source of directfinance through the Catalytic Fund. Practicallyspeaking, it is all but irrelevant to donors’commitment at Dakar to ensure that no countryfails to achieve the 2015 goal of universal primarycompletion for want of additional finance.The FTI Secretariatestimated thatUS$1.2 billion isneeded over theeighteen monthsto 2010 to meetexpected demand251