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Reaching the marginalized: EFA global monitoring report, 2010; 2010

Reaching the marginalized: EFA global monitoring report, 2010; 2010

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010CHAPTER 12Education for All Global Monitoring ReportBold languageon scaling upsocial protectionhas been backedonly by a vaguepledge of‘voluntarybilateralcontributions’13. One example is <strong>the</strong>pledge of US$100 billionin additional multilaterallending, originally madeseveral months before <strong>the</strong>G20 summit, with India,Indonesia and Ukraineidentified as being among<strong>the</strong> potential beneficiaries.to US$8 billion available in 2009 and <strong>2010</strong>, thoughone-quarter of that figure is accounted for byearly disbursement of existing loans. The G20framework makes about US$6 billion in newconcessional lending resources available to <strong>the</strong>IMF over 2009–2012 (around US$2 billion annually)for all low-income countries. The IMF itselfestimates that <strong>the</strong> increased lending capacity willcover only 2% of low-income countries’ externalfinancing needs (IMF, 2009d; Woods, 2009b). Actualtransfers of new financing will be contingent on <strong>the</strong>rate of disbursement. Given that disbursementsthrough <strong>the</strong> PRGF are often disrupted becausecountries cannot comply with loan conditions,<strong>the</strong>re are serious questions over <strong>the</strong> prospectsfor timely delivery.The World Bank’s role in <strong>the</strong> internationalresponse to <strong>the</strong> crisis is characterized by alarge gap between words and money. Manycommitments in <strong>the</strong> G20 communiqué, notablythose directed to low-income countries, representnot new money but an imaginative ‘relaunch’ ofpast pledges. 13 O<strong>the</strong>rs effectively exempt <strong>the</strong> G20countries from providing new and additionalfinancing, with bold language on scaling up socialprotection backed only by a vague pledge of‘voluntary bilateral contributions’.The World Bank has been left to act on <strong>the</strong> G20agenda mainly by drawing upon its own resourcesand facilities. While strong pronouncements havebeen made declaring that World Bank supportto crisis-affected countries is at a ‘record high’,increased lending has been sustained not byhigher donor support, but by a combination ofearly disbursement of funds – front-loading –and reprogramming.The Global Food Crisis Response Programme(GFRP) is a case in point. After eighteen months<strong>the</strong> programme had disbursed US$795 million,or 68% of its original funds – far too slow a pacegiven <strong>the</strong> immediacy of <strong>the</strong> crisis (United NationsConference on Trade and Development, 2009).Interventions have ranged from support to schoolfeeding programmes in Burundi, Liberia andSenegal to safety-net programmes in Ethiopia,<strong>the</strong> United Republic of Tanzania and Yemen, andbudget support in Bangladesh, Cambodia andHonduras. These programmes provide vital socialprotection, but <strong>the</strong> bulk of GFRP finance comesnot from increased aid but from existing countryallocations, regional International DevelopmentAssociation (IDA) funds and resources transferredfrom o<strong>the</strong>r facilities (Delgado, 2008). The only newsource of finance has been a multidonor trust fundthat channelled US$200 million to <strong>the</strong> GFRP. Mostof <strong>the</strong> US$20 billion pledged at <strong>the</strong> G8 summit forfood supplies also involves <strong>the</strong> diversion of existingaid commitments ra<strong>the</strong>r than new money.Some World Bank programmes appear not to havetaken off on any scale. The Rapid Social ResponseFund was created to assist poor and vulnerablepopulations in developing countries, mainly from<strong>the</strong> World Bank’s own resources. As of September2009, only one programme appears to have beenapproved – a cash transfer and nutritionintervention for children under 5 in Senegal(World Bank, 2009i).O<strong>the</strong>r programmes have generated large headlinenumbers under <strong>the</strong> banner of ‘crisis response’ withlittle in <strong>the</strong> way of new financing. In 2009, <strong>the</strong> WorldBank significantly increased financing provisionsfor countries affected by <strong>the</strong> crisis. Commitmentsunder IDA reached US$14 billion in 2009 and a newUS$2 billion facility was created to provide earlysupport in key areas of social protection, health andeducation. Almost half <strong>the</strong> allocations available hadbeen disbursed by late 2009 (World Bank, 2009d).However, most of <strong>the</strong> new financing came fromfront-loading of IDA allocations for low-incomecountries (Figure 1.5). Burkina Faso, Liberia andSenegal, among o<strong>the</strong>rs, received over 150% of<strong>the</strong>ir planned IDA allocations in 2009.As a crisis response measure, front-loadingmakes sense. Faced with mounting budgetpressure and rising poverty, countries need earlyaid. For households confronting hunger, healthrisks and <strong>the</strong> challenge of keeping children inschool, delays in social protection carry a highprice. But front-loading does not increase <strong>the</strong>overall resources available to governments over<strong>the</strong> full cycle of programme support. Moreover,it comes with its own risks, including <strong>the</strong> riskof financing deficits in later years. 14The upshot is that <strong>the</strong> World Bank has beeninvolved in an elaborate financial reshuffle. Effortsby <strong>the</strong> institution itself to address <strong>the</strong> issue ofmaking new resources available have not been14. The World Bank is not alone in combating <strong>the</strong> human developmentemergency through creative accounting. Plans drawn up by <strong>the</strong>EU Commission in May 2009 announced an intention to mobilize8.8 billion euros (approximately US$12 billion at May 2009 exchangerates) in development financing as a crisis response, but almost all <strong>the</strong>commitments and pledges behind this figure come from pre-existingcommitments (Woods, 2009b).34

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