Reaching the marginalized: EFA global monitoring report, 2010; 2010

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001CHAPTER 42Education for All Global Monitoring ReportThe moreextensive useof outcomeindicators tomeasure policyeffectiveness is awholly positivedevelopmentBox 4.7: Harmonization and alignment in the United Republic of Tanzania education programmeFrom 2001 to 2006, nine donors pooled funds to supportthe Primary Education Development Programme in theUnited Republic of Tanzania, with the World Bankproviding additional support. Measures in the programmeincluded the abolition of school fees in 2001, theintroduction of capitation grants for primary schoolsand a major classroom construction programme. Publiceducation spending rose, backed by increased aidcommitments. Donors were closely involved with theMinistry of Education in designing and implementingpolicies, and in financing. While the programme hasbrought about remarkable improvements in basiceducation, there have been strains in the aid partnership:Pooled fund disbursement was often delayed becauseof what donors saw as unclear quarterlyimplementation plans and late, inadequate progressreports from the government.Different reporting requirements for the World Bank andfor donors working under the pooled fund overstretchedgovernment employees responsible for reporting.has made result-based management a prioritythrough improved information sharing since 2004.In the past, government departments rarely sharedinformation for sector planning. New systems arebreaking down this fragmentation step by step,with an annual report providing an overview ofperformance measured against key educationsector objectives (Bangladesh Government, 2009).At its best, managing for results is aboutstrengthening the capacity of developing countrygovernments to determine what works on the basisof the best available evidence. The more extensiveuse of outcome indicators to measure policyeffectiveness is a wholly positive development.The drive towards results in aid managementis not without problems, however.Some donors see performance-based funding as anobvious corollary of a commitment to managementby results. While such funding takes many forms,the broad approach is to create incentives forgovernments to strengthen policies that are notachieving targets and to reward those that areperforming. The United States Millennium ChallengeAccount, created in 2004, provides funding on thebasis of policy reforms and development results.The Global Fund model also uses incentives toimprove poorly performing programmes.In Senegal, for example, a grant to combat malariaDonors reported concerns over exclusion fromdiscussions at key stages of programmeimplementation.Education Ministry officials felt that policy dialoguewith donors was often intrusive, sometimes leadingto additional aid conditions, and that donors did notrespect the principles of country ownership.Civil society representatives reported that they wereoften crowded out by the large number of donors anda lack of access to information.In 2007, all donors previously contributing to the pooledfund turned to general budget support. This was partlyin response to difficulties managing the pooled fund andpartly because the Government of the United Republicof Tanzania said it preferred budget support.Sources: Williamson et al. (2008); World Bank (2005b).was stopped due to underperformance andrestored only once the national programmehad been strengthened. Negative reviews ofprogrammes in the Laos People’s DemocraticRepublic, Lesotho and Nigeria have also ledto policy reform (Global Fund, 2009d).Does performance-based funding conflict with theprinciple of country ‘ownership’? All aid is to somedegree conditional on recipient governments beingseen as viable partners – and on results. Recipientsare likely to see performance-based funding aslegitimate if they have a role in setting goals anddeciding how best to achieve them (Abou Serie et al.,2009). In the case of the Global Fund, the centralrole of developing country governments and civilsociety in setting national targets, submittingfinancing and implementation plans, and jointlyreviewing progress creates a basis for countryownership. While there have sometimes beensevere tensions over the release of funds, in manycases governments already committed to reformappear to have accepted financing incentives.Under different conditions it is a small stepfrom performance-based support to old-styleconditionality, or worse. Recent proposals infavour of ‘cash-on-delivery’ aid for educationillustrate the problem (Box 4.8).238
THE AID COMPACT: FALLING SHORT OF COMMITMENTSAid for educationBox 4.8: Cash-on-delivery aid raises as many problems as it solvesLinking aid to results has an intuitive appeal. If thegoal is decent quality education, why not rewardgovernments with a cash payment for every additionalchild who completes primary education or achievesabove a set score on a standardized test? This is thecentral idea behind cash-on-delivery aid, which aimsto provide incentives for recipients to address theinstitutional and governance problems that canprevent aid from producing results.The appeal of cash-on-delivery aid is its focus onresults. Payments to aid recipients would be madeon the basis of verified improvement in outcomes(say, children completing primary education andreaching a specified learning standard) from anestablished baseline. Recipient governments would beleft free to decide on policies and on how to spend theaid they receive. While superficially offering a route togreater ownership, this model poses several problems:Penalizing governments for outcomes they do notcontrol. School attendance figures and completionrates can be strongly affected by factors such asdroughts, floods, unemployment and economicgrowth. In theory, an external auditor couldadjust achieved outcomes (and aid payments)by controlling for exogenous factors, and donorscould renegotiate their contract with aid recipients.In practice, unravelling the effects of variousinfluences requires data that are either unavailableor not likely to become available until much later.Shifting the risk. Development is a risky business.Neither national governments nor aid donors knowin advance with any certainty which policy inputs(public investment, targeted incentives, governancereforms and so on) will work. By conditioning aid onbroadly shared policy inputs, donors share the riskof failure with the recipient. Basing aid on outputtransfers risk to the recipient. If a particular input,designed and implemented with a genuine intentto achieve a positive outcome, does not work,the would-be aid recipient loses out while the donoris unaffected. Governments might adopt policiesaimed at removing a set of barriers to educationof the marginalized, only to find that the policiesproduce weaker results than expected, incurringcash-on-delivery aid penalties. In effect, this isold-style conditionality on a no-risk basis for donors.Far from encouraging innovation in aid recipientcountries, cash-on-delivery could have the oppositeeffect, creating incentives to avoid risk-taking.Diverting attention from the strengthening ofsystems. Cash-on-delivery aid places a premium onachieving short-term targets, such as getting morechildren through primary school, rather than longtermgoals such as strengthening the educationsystem, improving child nutrition and training moreteachers. For governments that choose cash-ondeliveryaid for quantitative targets, there are alsopotential tensions with qualitative goals, as hasbeen widely documented in the health sector.Creating incentives for misreporting. By linkingpayments to verified results, cash-on-delivery aidhas the potential to create perverse incentives, withgovernments being rewarded for over-reporting —another phenomenon documented in the healthsector. Programmes under the auspices of the GAVIAlliance include a payment for every vaccinatedchild above a baseline. Research indicates that insome countries, including Bangladesh, Indonesiaand Mali, official data systematically understatethe baseline and overstate subsequent coverage.Bypassing ‘underperformers’. Cash-on-deliveryaid effectively penalizes countries that miss theirtargets. This raises the immediate question of whatto do with such countries, many of which are likelyto be in the greatest need of support. Should theybe disregarded? Or should it be assumed that theprospect of increased aid will create an incentivefor policy change?Accelerated progress towards education for allrequires far-reaching changes in monetary and nonmonetaryincentives, backed by changes in rules foraccountability and reporting, aimed at changinginstitutional behaviour. Under some limited conditions,cash-on-delivery approaches might complementbroader performance-based incentives, but theyshould be developed in the context of national policy,not unequal negotiations between donors andrecipients.Sources: Birdsall et al. (2008); de Renzio and Woods (2007);Lockheed (2008); Lim et al. (2008).By linkingpayments toverified results,cash-on-deliveryaid has thepotential tocreate perverseincentivesConclusionTranslating the Paris Declaration principles intopractical strategies requires donors and recipientsto reconsider the distribution of political power inaid partnerships. Effective aid requires a nationalpolicy environment in recipient countries that isconducive to planning. It also requires donors to acton their commitments to deliver more predictableaid. Donors also need to resist the temptationto micromanage aid, either formally (throughconditionality) or informally (through control overfinance). Delivering development assistance in waysthat strengthen national capabilities is not justmore effective – it is a route out of aid dependence.239
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CONTENTSChapter 4The aid compact: f
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100CONTENTS2Education for All Globa
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HIGHLIGHTS OF THE EFA REPORT 2010Hi
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OVERVIEW© XINHUA/Gamma/Eyedea Pres
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OVERVIEWChapter 2Monitoring progres
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OVERVIEWis open to question. Many n
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OVERVIEWon the scale of marginaliza
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OVERVIEWhome from the language of i
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OVERVIEW© Crispin Hughes/PANOSthe
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OVERVIEWThe reform process starts b
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Education for All Global Monitoring
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EDUCATION AT RISK: THE IMPACT OF TH
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PROGRESS TOWARDS THE EFA GOALSIntro
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PROGRESS TOWARDS THE EFA GOALSEarly
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PROGRESS TOWARDS THE EFA GOALSUnive
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PROGRESS TOWARDS THE EFA GOALSYouth
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PROGRESS TOWARDS THE EFA GOALSThe q
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PROGRESS TOWARDS THE EFA GOALSEstim
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REACHING THE MARGINALIZEDIntroducti
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REACHING THE MARGINALIZEDIntroducti
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REACHING THE MARGINALIZEDMeasuring
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REACHING THE MARGINALIZEDGetting le
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Page 201 and 202: REACHING THE MARGINALIZEDLevelling
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THE EDUCATION FOR ALL DEVELOPMENT I
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THE EDUCATION FOR ALL DEVELOPMENT I
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SELECTED INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
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EDUCATIONAL EFFECT OF SELECTED SOCI
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STATISTICAL TABLESIntroductionunder
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STATISTICAL TABLESIntroductionLithu
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STATISTICAL TABLESTable 1CurrentUS$
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STATISTICAL TABLESTable 2YOUTH LITE
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STATISTICAL TABLESTable 3ACHILD WEL
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STATISTICAL TABLESTable 3ATuberculo
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STATISTICAL TABLESTable 3ACHILD WEL
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STATISTICAL TABLESTable 3ATuberculo
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STATISTICAL TABLESTable 3BGROSS ENR
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STATISTICAL TABLESTable 3BGROSS ENR
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01ANNEX02Education for All Global M
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0102ANNEXTable 5Participation in pr
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1002ANNEXTable 7Internal efficiency
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01ANNEX02Table 7 (continued)DROPOUT
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01ANNEX02Table 9B. Tertiary educati
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01ANNEX02Table 9B (continued)PERCEN
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1020ANNEXTable 12Trends in basic or
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2 0 10Education for All Global Moni
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20Education for All Global Monitori
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0120ANNEXEducation for All Global M
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