Reaching the marginalized: EFA global monitoring report, 2010; 2010

001CHAPTER 42Education for All Global Monitoring ReportThe moreextensive useof outcomeindicators tomeasure policyeffectiveness is awholly positivedevelopmentBox 4.7: Harmonization and alignment in the United Republic of Tanzania education programmeFrom 2001 to 2006, nine donors pooled funds to supportthe Primary Education Development Programme in theUnited Republic of Tanzania, with the World Bankproviding additional support. Measures in the programmeincluded the abolition of school fees in 2001, theintroduction of capitation grants for primary schoolsand a major classroom construction programme. Publiceducation spending rose, backed by increased aidcommitments. Donors were closely involved with theMinistry of Education in designing and implementingpolicies, and in financing. While the programme hasbrought about remarkable improvements in basiceducation, there have been strains in the aid partnership:Pooled fund disbursement was often delayed becauseof what donors saw as unclear quarterlyimplementation plans and late, inadequate progressreports from the government.Different reporting requirements for the World Bank andfor donors working under the pooled fund overstretchedgovernment employees responsible for reporting.has made result-based management a prioritythrough improved information sharing since 2004.In the past, government departments rarely sharedinformation for sector planning. New systems arebreaking down this fragmentation step by step,with an annual report providing an overview ofperformance measured against key educationsector objectives (Bangladesh Government, 2009).At its best, managing for results is aboutstrengthening the capacity of developing countrygovernments to determine what works on the basisof the best available evidence. The more extensiveuse of outcome indicators to measure policyeffectiveness is a wholly positive development.The drive towards results in aid managementis not without problems, however.Some donors see performance-based funding as anobvious corollary of a commitment to managementby results. While such funding takes many forms,the broad approach is to create incentives forgovernments to strengthen policies that are notachieving targets and to reward those that areperforming. The United States Millennium ChallengeAccount, created in 2004, provides funding on thebasis of policy reforms and development results.The Global Fund model also uses incentives toimprove poorly performing programmes.In Senegal, for example, a grant to combat malariaDonors reported concerns over exclusion fromdiscussions at key stages of programmeimplementation.Education Ministry officials felt that policy dialoguewith donors was often intrusive, sometimes leadingto additional aid conditions, and that donors did notrespect the principles of country ownership.Civil society representatives reported that they wereoften crowded out by the large number of donors anda lack of access to information.In 2007, all donors previously contributing to the pooledfund turned to general budget support. This was partlyin response to difficulties managing the pooled fund andpartly because the Government of the United Republicof Tanzania said it preferred budget support.Sources: Williamson et al. (2008); World Bank (2005b).was stopped due to underperformance andrestored only once the national programmehad been strengthened. Negative reviews ofprogrammes in the Laos People’s DemocraticRepublic, Lesotho and Nigeria have also ledto policy reform (Global Fund, 2009d).Does performance-based funding conflict with theprinciple of country ‘ownership’? All aid is to somedegree conditional on recipient governments beingseen as viable partners – and on results. Recipientsare likely to see performance-based funding aslegitimate if they have a role in setting goals anddeciding how best to achieve them (Abou Serie et al.,2009). In the case of the Global Fund, the centralrole of developing country governments and civilsociety in setting national targets, submittingfinancing and implementation plans, and jointlyreviewing progress creates a basis for countryownership. While there have sometimes beensevere tensions over the release of funds, in manycases governments already committed to reformappear to have accepted financing incentives.Under different conditions it is a small stepfrom performance-based support to old-styleconditionality, or worse. Recent proposals infavour of ‘cash-on-delivery’ aid for educationillustrate the problem (Box 4.8).238