MICHAEL DEMPSEY - Cranfield University

trade unions; it is easy to see the polemical potential of an idea like
this.
The Webbs (1920) recognised the possibility that officers could develop
different ideas and outlooks. But they believed that some form of
bureaucracy was desirable, mainly to take account of unions becoming
more complex organisations but also in order to regulate the members
so as to protect the union itself from the consequences of irresponsible
action. The analysis therefore involved recognition of the inevitability of
the development of Weberian forms of bureaucratic organisation,
understanding that this would lead to complex power relationships
between members and officers. This involved recognition of the ways in
which officers had on the one hand to remain close to the members
whilst on the other hand maintaining the integrity of the union itself.
Marxist theorists share much of this analysis (see Kelly 1988 chapter
7), save that they saw the ‘irresponsibility’ of the members as evidence
of the manifestation of class struggle and the organisational work of
officers as evidence of their collaboration with capitalism. These ideas,
not surprisingly, perpetuate, as Kelly and Heery (1994:196) note, the
‘over-simplistic’ bureaucracy vs rank and file division which has proved
so unhelpful in examining the dynamics and organisation of trade
unions.
Using phrases like ‘optimistic’ and ‘pessimistic’ is a value laden action
because if one adopts a Marxist perspective, the development of
oligarchies and cleavages between members and officials, elected and
appointed, might be expected to increase class consciousness and
therefore enhance the class struggle, something Marxists would be
optimistic about. Representing the views and interests of the members,
though, is such a significant trade union goal that it does not seem
unreasonable to regard Michelsian and Marxist approaches as being
pessimistic in that they posit the inevitable ‘selling out’ of the
membership.
In these terms, there is more optimistic material available. Weber
himself (1920), who interestingly was Michels’ teacher, believed that
because of the greater efficiency of bureaucracy, it would render
obsolete all traditional forms of rule. A deal of writing on the topic,
however, tends, implicitly or explicitly, to assume the existence of
oligarchic tendencies and to identify ways in which they can be kept at
bay. Hyde (1984) advocates the need for the membership to formulate
bargaining demands and to ratify agreements. Hartley (1982) seeks
more freedom for what in the USA are called ‘locals’ and protection of
minority rights. Bok and Dunlop (1970) point to the importance of
internal interest groups in describing the influence members can exert
over union policy. Schwab (1992) draws an analogy with the corporate
sector, suggesting that the problems faced by members in controlling
leaders are similar to those faced by shareholders in controlling
managers – though he suggests that because of the altruism of some,
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