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MICHAEL DEMPSEY - Cranfield University

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Financial systems and planning<br />

At the time the research into the CWU took place, financial systems<br />

were certainly not rigorous, but the need for a rigorous approach had<br />

arisen from the new management team seeking to tackle the union’s<br />

financial problems, the context being one where the union’s<br />

development of management generally was at an early stage,<br />

consistent withy the earlier phase of merger which it had reached. But<br />

the systems in the other unions were rigorous and controlled, even if<br />

the centralised nature of those in PCS and UNiFI caused stresses<br />

amongst those who had insufficient authority to deploy resources<br />

themselves. The latter union did have aspirations to devolve budgets<br />

when the time became appropriate but had not done so when this<br />

research ended. If, however, links between planning and budgetary<br />

control are a measure of rigour, none of the unions measured up. All<br />

believed that their planning processes would determine levels of<br />

activity in their unions; all but PCS sought to link planning and<br />

resources in some way but not in ways which commercial<br />

organisations, or even public sector ones, would usually recognise.<br />

Representative rationality<br />

In all four unions, lay members were involved in resource allocation to<br />

a greater or lesser extent. This is not a surprise; if there is one aspect<br />

of governance in which one would expect the representative system to<br />

be involved, it is that of resource disposition. There are understandings,<br />

certainly in three of the unions, that the cost of the representative<br />

system is an issue in budgetary control and that it carries with it the risk<br />

of its being seen that the administrative tail is wagging the<br />

representative dog. They could, of course, argue that more meetings<br />

do not equate with more representative governance. However, unions<br />

seem to be very slow to take the step of curtailing representative<br />

structures in order to free resources for other purposes, or just to save<br />

money in a crisis. It is suggested in CWU and UNiFI, both in some<br />

financial difficulty when the research took place, that these issues<br />

needed to be addressed but by the time the research had been<br />

concluded, they had not done so in any corporate ways.<br />

‘Fairness’<br />

In all unions beliefs were expressed about the need to ensure that<br />

resource distribution should be issue driven rather than responding to<br />

the power of numbers. It did seem, in fact, that structural steps had<br />

been taken to prevent the latter; in two unions (PCS and UNiFI), per<br />

capita budgeting had been an issue that had been defeated. In UNiFI<br />

also, the principle of company committee autonomy underpins this. Not<br />

all the company committees relate to large banks. Small building<br />

societies and financial institutions have their own committees – some<br />

managers serviced from Bournemouth or Raines Park institutions on<br />

the Channel Islands where, they said, air fares were the highest in<br />

Europe - and managers dealing with these smaller organisations were<br />

confident that they were entitled to manage sufficient resources. In<br />

380

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