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MICHAEL DEMPSEY - Cranfield University

MICHAEL DEMPSEY - Cranfield University

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inevitable consequence of organisational creation. But this is not<br />

supported in this research<br />

Partnership<br />

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, a criterion for this model is the<br />

assumption that managers want to do a good job and are effective<br />

stewards of the union’s resources (Cornforth 2002:3). It assumes<br />

expertise on the part of activists so that they can make equal<br />

partnership a reality – something which some trade union managers<br />

recognise and some do not. Managers in this research identify<br />

circumstances of equal partnership with lay activists but others identify<br />

circumstances of low trust and competitive behaviour. In trying to<br />

establish exactly what the partnership model might look like in trade<br />

unions, however, Cornforth’s definition is potentially useful. If applied<br />

here, it might suggest that none of the case study unions was truly a<br />

partnership.<br />

Stakeholder<br />

Cornforth (2002) focuses, in discussing this model, on external<br />

stakeholders, as Freeman (1984) originally intended. The role of the<br />

Executive Council is to represent stakeholder interests – which is<br />

certainly what one would expect as elected representatives – but as<br />

stakeholders themselves they would be likely also to represent political<br />

or societal interests. Thus, this model enables one to think of EC<br />

members, realistically, as bringing to the EC their experiences and<br />

affiliations as socialists, feminists, environmentalists, workers in<br />

particular specialisms and so on. Thus, for managers, managing<br />

political boundaries becomes an issue.<br />

Co-optation<br />

If one regards the stakeholders that a union primarily relies on for its<br />

resources as the members and the role of Executive Council members<br />

as spanning boundaries between managers and members, then this<br />

idea can explain some aspects of union governance. When UNiFI<br />

required a subscriptions increase, it mounted a campaign amongst the<br />

membership which was designed by managers but in which lay<br />

activists played a crucial part in approving and implementing.<br />

Compliance<br />

There are some similarities between agency theory, which is at the<br />

heart of this model, and theories of trade union governance which<br />

assume that officials and members have different interests and the<br />

function of activists is to control officials in the interests of the<br />

members. In that this research has found managers and activists<br />

competing over boundaries in polyarchal organisations, this model can<br />

help to explain some of the relationships observed.<br />

Democratic<br />

Cornforth (2002:4) says that a democratic perspective on governance<br />

suggests that the job of the Executive Council is to represent the<br />

399

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