MICHAEL DEMPSEY - Cranfield University

technological systems and the appointment of professional finance
officers.
‘Rigour’ is not a measurable concept but three of the four case study
unions had systems budgeting for and monitoring income and
expenditure, operated by professional finance officers. The fourth,
CWU, maintained a strong central grip on expenditure though the
manager responsible for finance, an elected manager, believed that
new systems were necessary to add rigour to the process. Some rigour
is clearly evident here, although in none of the unions, despite their
planning processes, were their systems explicitly linked to financial
planning in the sense that activities were costed and measured.
Three of the systems were strongly centralised, in one union explicitly
because of merger; but in that case the systems were in existence prior
to merger. In two of the three unions, far from seeking centralisation,
the aspiration was to decentralise, something already practised in
UNISON.
Willman et al’s (1993) hypotheses were based on their discussions
about the distinction between administrative and representative
rationality and their formulation of the ‘two markets’ model of union
organisation. Their proposition is that administrative rationality will be
unlikely to prevail, hence that unions will adopt satisficing rather than
maximising behaviour. This posits not just a distinction between
administrative and representative rationality but conflict between them.
The evidence here is that lay members are involved in the budgetary
process. In the case of the CWU, managers were trying to involve them
more. Managers are aware that there are potential implications in
budgetary control for representative systems but in no union does there
seem to have been any managerial attempt to grasp the issue.
Furthermore, there is some evidence in all unions to the effect that
minorities within the union should be treated fairly in resource
distribution, suggesting that managers are aware of ‘norms’ influencing
their behaviour that are relevant to issues of representative rationality.
It is therefore suggested that this research offers little support for either
of Willman et al’s (1993) hypotheses. There are financial systems, with
varying degrees of rigour, depending how one defines that word.
Finance was seen as particularly important on merger in UNiFI and it
was the subject of great concern in CWU in that its income was
exceeding its expenditure, so this would offer some support for the
second limb of hypothesis 1, even though, certainly in UNISON,
finance appeared to be a subject of importance even though the union
was not in crisis.
Three systems are centralised and the fourth involves setting of
budgets centrally. However, the involvement of lay members in
resource decisions, sometimes with increased responsibilities, does not
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