MICHAEL DEMPSEY - Cranfield University

suggest depoliticisation. In that the hypothesis implies power strategies
by union leaders to control finance in the interests of maximising their
own power, this does not seem to be supported.
The interface with lay activists and members
There are two propositions relating to stakeholder management in this
research. The working assumption was that, in a trade union having
polyarchal features, containing many legitimate interest groups,
stakeholder management was likely to be the way in which trade union
managers went about their business. This would, it was believed, be
based on trade union principles (hence proposition 4.2) and be
concerned, in practice, with aspects of boundary management
(proposition 5). ‘Norms’ and ‘meanings’ deriving from culture and
values were examined using the framework of Hales (1999).
As pointed out several times, polyarchy theory usually carries with it the
assumption of competition, even conflict, between interest groups (e.g.
James 1984) and this, it was suggested, placed the theory in the
pessimistic tradition of power relations in unions. This research did not
make that assumption. Indeed, in that it posited ‘normative’ stakeholder
management as the form practised by trade union managers, it moved
into ethical realms where the intrinsic value of stakeholder interests
were accepted (Donaldson and Preston 1995). Of course, the fact that
interests compete for attention within a polyarchy does not necessarily
mean that the parties do not accept the intrinsic value of each others’
interests. But the pessimistic tradition (e.g. Michels 1915, Kelly 1988)
assumes that salaried officers in many cases will not act in the interests
of the members. Normative stakeholder management does not imply
that stakeholder managers act in this way. Indeed, ethical theories
such as that of Argandoňa (1988) talk of different groups and their
members achieving their own perfection.
The assumption was that, as has already been discussed, trade union
principles would influence how trade union managers behaved – in the
terms of proposition 4.2, the principles suggested by Batstone et al
(1977). As noted above, the research suggests that the more limited
definition of Willman (1980) is more recognisable, presenting ideas of
‘justice and fairness’.
In terms of commitment to ideas of representative rationality, there are
many expressions to this effect (Exhibit 4.4) and actions demonstrating
that. Bok and Dunlop (1970) comment on the value of interest groups
in the expression of member views. Managers in PCS and UNISON
explain, in some cases, their role in setting up such structures and of
their intrinsic value. Managers in all the case study unions have
described their role in facilitating or actively implementing the greater,
more informed or more prepared involvement of lay members in union
activities.
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