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MICHAEL DEMPSEY - Cranfield University

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experiences of work which have led to the delegate forming the value<br />

systems that have resulted in her espousing trade unionism.<br />

Ontologically, realism believes that the ultimate objects of inquiry exist<br />

and act independently of scientists and their activity. Social reality is<br />

viewed as a socially constructed world where the objective of research<br />

is to explain observable phenomena with reference to underlying<br />

structures and mechanisms. Realist epistemology is based on the<br />

building of models of such mechanisms such that, if they were to exist<br />

and act in the postulated way, they would account for the phenomena<br />

being examined. The models are hypothetical and can only be known<br />

by constructing ideas about them. (Blaikie 1993:172).<br />

Mechanisms are, consequently, of critical importance in realist<br />

ontology. Blaikie (1993), discussing Bhaskar’s (1978) and Harré’s<br />

(1970) outlines of realism, says as follows:-‘(Bhaskar) argued that there<br />

is a distinction between a causal law and a pattern of events. A<br />

constant conjunction must be backed by a theory which provides an<br />

explanation of the link between the two events, a theory which provides<br />

a conception or picture of the mechanism or structure at work. These<br />

mechanisms are nothing more than the tendencies or powers that<br />

things have to act in a particular way. The capacity of a thing to<br />

exercise its powers, or the likelihood that it does, will depend on the<br />

circumstances which may be favourable or unfavourable. Realism is<br />

ultimately a search for generative mechanisms.’ (p 59). Blaikie goes on<br />

to cite Harré and Secord (1972) to the effect that at the start of a realist<br />

investigation, one needs to produce in theoretical studies a rational<br />

explanation of non-random patterns by identifying the causal or<br />

generative mechanisms which produce those patterns.<br />

My understanding of these ideas was greatly helped by reading an<br />

outline of realist social science in Pawson and Tilley (1997). This book<br />

is concerned with the evaluation of social programmes but it succeeds<br />

in explaining a realist approach to such programmes in highly practical<br />

terms. Thus:-<br />

‘Identifying mechanisms involves the attempt to develop propositions<br />

about what it is within the program which triggers a reaction from its<br />

subjects. These hypothesised processes attempt to mirror how<br />

programmes actually work’. (1997 p. 66).<br />

‘The idea is that the mechanism is responsible for the relationship<br />

itself. A mechanism is thus not a variable but an account of the<br />

makeup, behaviour and interrelationships of those processes which are<br />

responsible for the regularity. A mechanism is thus a theory – a theory<br />

which spells out the potential of human resources and reasoning.’<br />

(p68)<br />

‘The basic task of social inquiry is to explain interesting, puzzling,<br />

socially significant regularities. (R). Explanation takes the form of<br />

57

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