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MICHAEL DEMPSEY - Cranfield University

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managers approached their relations with their organisation’s<br />

stakeholders in ways which reflected their trade union principles.<br />

Whether articulated or not, normative stakeholder theory, insofar as it is<br />

possible to define it, is a relevant concept.<br />

This discussion has been a lengthy one because of the potential links<br />

of stakeholder theories of governance to polyarchal theories of trade<br />

union organisation. The latter, however, are usually based on<br />

pessimistic notions of governance, positing a situation where interest<br />

groups are in conflict, whereas many contributions in discussions of<br />

stakeholder theory focus on the positive rights of stakeholders and the<br />

need for management to attend to them.<br />

Stakeholder theory is not the only theory of governance which could be<br />

relevant here. Cornforth (2002) examines the governance of public and<br />

non-profit organisations, an area which he says in under-theorised. He<br />

proposes a paradox perspective as a conceptual framework to bring<br />

together a number of different theoretical perspectives in a consistent<br />

manner and explain their domains of application. He uses the language<br />

of ‘owners’ and ‘boards’ but it is easy to adapt this to enlighten a<br />

discussion of the relative roles of, particularly, activists in unions and<br />

trade union managers who interact with them. Exhibit 2.1, adapted from<br />

Cornforth’s article, seeks to do this.<br />

The ideas here are of considerable interest. The case studies will<br />

reveal a variety of relationships between managers and activists. The<br />

partnership model – seen in this study as midway between the<br />

conception of membership participation and leadership predominance<br />

(Fairbrother 2000) – is clearly recognisable. The democratic model may<br />

perhaps be related to the membership predominance perspective and<br />

the ‘rubber stamp’ model to that of leadership predominance. Cornforth<br />

(2002) describes the role of the (Executive Council) under agency<br />

theory, and also under resource dependency theory, as ‘boundary<br />

spanning’, and we shall see that boundary management is a key issue<br />

in the relationships between activists and managers. This is something<br />

which has been addressed in literature relating to different types of<br />

organisations; network organisations (Hirschorn and Gilmore 1992),<br />

public sector organisations (Baddeley and Payne 1997; Peters 1998)<br />

and the non-profit sector (Kramer 1985, Leat 1988, Harris 1991). Whilst<br />

these represent different historical and/or practical contexts, such work<br />

may be of interest in examining the dynamics of these relationships.<br />

So although the propositions below focus on stakeholder theories, it<br />

may be that other theories of governance will assist in explaining how<br />

activists and managers relate. One does not have to abandon<br />

stakeholding language in this exercise. Cornforth specifically looks at<br />

the interests of different stakeholders so the application of his ideas<br />

remains consistent with the notion of interest groups pursuing<br />

legitimate goals within a trade union, seen as a polyarchy, and of trade<br />

union managers seeking to manage within such a framework.<br />

29

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