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MICHAEL DEMPSEY - Cranfield University

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that whichever party is gaining autonomy will welcome merger;<br />

whichever is losing it will be more ambivalent. This proposition involves<br />

complex stakeholder dynamics, the isolation of which would be of<br />

interest in any future trade union mergers.<br />

We have seen that, though unions are organisations responding to<br />

numerous stakeholder groups and that although there are complex<br />

dynamics between activist stakeholders and managerial stakeholders,<br />

normative stakeholder management does not provide an adequate<br />

explanation for the way trade union managers manage in such an<br />

environment. But neither, it is suggested, are the stakeholder dynamics<br />

of a character which would support theories of oligarchy (e.g. Michels<br />

1915). Kelly and Heery’s (1994: 196) characterisation of the traditional<br />

bureaucracy vs rank and file division as being ‘unhelpful’ would seem<br />

to be a wise conclusion, particularly now that trade union managers<br />

have been revealed as actors in the dramas of union life. We have<br />

seen that, in certain circumstances, union managers and activists have<br />

both shared goals and conflicting goals and contend for power and<br />

influence over boundaries, some of which it has been possible to<br />

identify. This describes, it is suggested, polyarchies in which, as James<br />

(1984) found, managers and activists (inter alia) compete for control<br />

over decision-making.<br />

Models of governance<br />

It remains to consider whether Cornforth’s (2002) ‘paradox’ perspective<br />

on governance might help provide more complete explanations of how<br />

managers and activists relate in union governance. Exhibit 2.5 adapts<br />

this perspective to a trade union environment. Using Fairbrother’s<br />

(2000) framework as a basis, it might be possible to place these<br />

models on a continuum as follows:-<br />

Cornforth: Rubber stamp Partnership Co-optation Compliance Democratic<br />

Stakeholder<br />

Fairbrother: Leadership predominance Partnership Membership participation<br />

EXHIBIT 10.2. Models of governance. Adapted from Fairbrother<br />

(2000) and Cornforth (2002)<br />

Discussing this framework in the light of this research:-<br />

Rubber stamp/leadership predominance<br />

In the four case study unions, this was something which managers<br />

resisted, though they were able to identify it in respect of certain of the<br />

old unions. It was suggested by one manager that it was an outdated<br />

notion. Cornforth (2002) says that, under this model, control would<br />

have been ceded to a new managerial class. In trade unions, there is a<br />

new category of manager and managers contend for power; theories of<br />

oligarchy (cf Michels 1915) might suggest that this model was the<br />

398

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