Proceedings of the 12th European Conference on Knowledge ...

3. Study design
Kaj Suneson and Ilona Heldal
During <strong>the</strong> summer and autumn <strong>of</strong> 2009, 49 interviews (each <strong>of</strong> at least one hour's duration) were
performed with informants who represented different levels in <strong>the</strong> decision hierarchy within <strong>the</strong> launch
and user organizations. For fur<strong>the</strong>r information, see (Heldal et al., 2010).
All interviews were semi-structured with five prepared topics <strong>of</strong> interest:
Experiences <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> roll-out
Experiences from early usage
Co-operation and collaboration
Culture and opinions regarding regulations
User expectations in general.
The interpretations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> informants' answers are developed from a hermeneutic process where
different aspects and statements from <strong>the</strong> interviews grow toge<strong>the</strong>r in discussions to form a picture <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> situation being examined. The major problem areas and important elements <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> situations were
presented at a workshop with representatives (45 people) from <strong>the</strong> organizations involved. The
participants acknowledged <strong>the</strong> interpretations as being good descriptions focused on <strong>the</strong> major
problems in <strong>the</strong> launch process.
4. Knowledge barriers in a perspective taken from NDM
In this section we present certain findings for each part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> interviews, with identified knowledge
barriers and proposed links to sensemaking, situation awareness and mental models.
4.1 Experiences <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> roll-out
The user informants stated that initially <strong>the</strong>y had high expectations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> new radio communication
system through extensive improvements in communication. Both <strong>the</strong> launching organizations and
user organizations wanted an 'open' process to adopt and implement functions to meet <strong>the</strong> users'
needs.
Originally, <strong>the</strong> system was set up via requirements laid down by <strong>the</strong> government authorities. Users felt
that <strong>the</strong> implementation required a great deal <strong>of</strong> time and effort in <strong>the</strong>ir day-to-day work. In most
organizations no extra resources were allocated for implementation. They did not perceive
<strong>the</strong>mselves as having sufficient knowledge <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> system to find a good, working configuration
immediately. They had a difficult time describing requirements for <strong>the</strong> new system due to a lack <strong>of</strong>
knowledge <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> technology (technical barrier) and <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> technology as part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir everyday work
(organizational barrier). Their mental model for rescue operations did not include this new
communication system or <strong>the</strong> procedures for using it. The launch informants claimed that <strong>the</strong> users
who worked with <strong>the</strong> system should adjust configurations according to <strong>the</strong>ir needs. The launching
authority did not have sufficient knowledge or a good mental model to see how <strong>the</strong> specific set-up
could contribute to <strong>the</strong> user organizations' everyday work.
The work premises for <strong>the</strong> launching organization and <strong>the</strong> user organizations are quite different. User
organizations need to make a lot <strong>of</strong> decisions in a setting in which NDM was developed, with many
important decisions made using incomplete information, a weak structure, uncertain outcomes and
high stakes, while <strong>the</strong> personnel in <strong>the</strong> launching organizations are used to working with decisions
based on well-formulated goals and with quite a long time to evaluate different options (behavioural
and inter-organizational barriers). This does not make <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> creating a mental model that is
coherent and agreed upon easier. Even if knowledge bases were complementary, a common
knowledge base, needed for good performance, was lacking (e.g. Mosier 1997). The view <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> rollout
and how it should be handled differed due to <strong>the</strong> differences in <strong>the</strong> normal sensemaking
processes and mental models. The launching organization devoted a great <strong>of</strong> interest to making
procedures that ensured <strong>the</strong> systems' security, even if it meant that bureaucratic processes were
needed.
Some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> effects <strong>of</strong> this – early on in <strong>the</strong> roll-out process – were that equipment (terminals) had to
be sent away to be configured/programmed centrally. This was to ensure that <strong>the</strong> systems' basic
functions for security would not be compromised. This required extra terminals, which were felt to be
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