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sectoral economic costs and benefits of ghg mitigation - IPCC

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Patrick Criqui, Nikos Kouvaritakis <strong>and</strong> Leo Schrattenholzer<br />

Figure 14<br />

Carbon intensity <strong>of</strong> GDP, per capita GDP <strong>and</strong> per capita emissions in the<br />

Reference <strong>and</strong> Kyoto II cases (1990-2010-2020-2030)<br />

tC/1000 $<br />

0.50<br />

0.45<br />

0.40<br />

0.35<br />

0.30<br />

0.25<br />

0.20<br />

0.15<br />

0.10<br />

0.05<br />

0.00<br />

1 2 3 4 5 6 tC/per cap<br />

0 20 40 60<br />

North Am Ref<br />

North Am K II<br />

EU Ref<br />

EU K II<br />

Pac OECD Ref<br />

Pac OECD K II<br />

Rest Ann B Ref<br />

Rest Ann B K II<br />

Asia Ref<br />

Asia K II<br />

RoW Ref<br />

RoW K II<br />

1 000 $90 per cap<br />

Source: POLES model<br />

The consequences <strong>of</strong> the Kyoto II scenario in terms <strong>of</strong> per capita CO 2 endowments by world<br />

region are illustrated in<br />

Figure 14, which plots carbon intensity <strong>of</strong> GDP against per capita GDP <strong>and</strong> thus shows different<br />

isoquants corresponding to constant levels <strong>of</strong> per capita emission. Two general characteristics <strong>of</strong><br />

this target <strong>and</strong> trade scenario must be highlighted:<br />

- the emission trajectory implied is an ambitious one; it corresponds broadly to trajectories<br />

examined in the <strong>IPCC</strong> process with a stabilisation <strong>of</strong> World emissions around 2030 as a<br />

prelude for eventual reductions, which alone could in the long-term result in the stabilisation<br />

<strong>of</strong> atmospheric concentrations;<br />

- the intensity <strong>of</strong> the effort required is greater for Annex B countries than for the rest <strong>of</strong> the<br />

World; this is naturally consistent with the debate within the international negotiation process<br />

<strong>and</strong> is reflected in the very existence <strong>of</strong> a separate Annex for industrialised countries.<br />

It should however be noted that for developing regions, the “Kyoto II” scenario, was expressly<br />

designed to be as simple as possible, implying reductions in per capita emissions relative to the<br />

reference, which are not negligible. This simply illustrates the fact that the global stabilisation<br />

target adopted in this exercise may progressively impose severe constraints also on these<br />

countries, unless Annex B countries accept much more stringent carbon entitlements than the<br />

ones considered here. Given the secular increases in the share <strong>of</strong> non-Annex B countries in total<br />

emissions in almost any scenario considered, it becomes clear that such stringency could acquire<br />

unrealistic proportions.<br />

4.2. The impacts <strong>of</strong> meeting a CO 2 constraint in 2030 with an endogenous technology<br />

framework<br />

Based on the learning curve approach, one <strong>of</strong> POLES’ main innovations is that it specifically<br />

takes into account cumulated R&D as an explanatory variable for technological progress (see<br />

above Sub-section 3.4.). The other salient feature is that it explicitly considers the market for<br />

capital equipment identifying individual agents on the supply side, satisfying the dem<strong>and</strong> for new<br />

equipment obtained, for each simulation period, from the main model. Those agents devote a<br />

share <strong>of</strong> their cash flow to energy technology R&D, allocating their R&D budget to the most<br />

127

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