sectoral economic costs and benefits of ghg mitigation - IPCC
sectoral economic costs and benefits of ghg mitigation - IPCC
sectoral economic costs and benefits of ghg mitigation - IPCC
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
Fossil Fuels<br />
World gas use falls by 230 BCM per year below BaU projections in 2010, <strong>and</strong> 280 BCM in<br />
2020. Total gas dem<strong>and</strong> is equivalent to 57.5 <strong>and</strong> 79 million barrels per day in 2010 <strong>and</strong> 2020 in<br />
the BaU case. Gas dem<strong>and</strong> falls below the BaU levels by 4 mbl/d <strong>of</strong> oil equivalent in 2010, <strong>and</strong><br />
4.8 mbl/d in 2020 world-wide, 4.2 mbl/d <strong>and</strong> 5.7 mbl/d in 2010 <strong>and</strong> 2020 in the Annex I region.<br />
The adverse impact on gas is therefore larger than the impact on oil, both in absolute <strong>and</strong> in<br />
relative terms.<br />
As in the case <strong>of</strong> oil, non-Annex I dem<strong>and</strong> for gas increases due to price reductions relative to the<br />
BaU levels. Non-Annex I countries increase gas use by 11 <strong>and</strong> 56 bcm in 2010 <strong>and</strong> 2020 relative<br />
to the BaU levels, which is equivalent to 190 <strong>and</strong> 962 thous<strong>and</strong> barrels <strong>of</strong> oil per day. This is<br />
only one tenth <strong>and</strong> one third <strong>of</strong> the ‘leakage’ observed in the oil market. Gas prices fall by an<br />
average <strong>of</strong> 6 <strong>and</strong> 8 per cent from the BaU levels for the years 2010 <strong>and</strong> 2020.<br />
Similar to coal, three quarters <strong>of</strong> total gas are used in electricity <strong>and</strong> energy intensive industries.<br />
Reductions from BaU projections shown in Table 4 for these two sectors amount to 2.9 <strong>and</strong> 3.6<br />
mbl/d oil equivalent in 2010 <strong>and</strong> 2020 out <strong>of</strong> total reductions in gas dem<strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> 4 <strong>and</strong> 4.8 mbl/d<br />
oil equivalent. ‘Leakage’ in gas use is 200 <strong>and</strong> 900 thous<strong>and</strong> bl/d oe for the two periods as world<br />
gas prices decline <strong>and</strong> non-Annex I countries substitute away from coal.<br />
Comparing the impact <strong>of</strong> Kyoto produces surprising results: the quantitative impact on gas is<br />
about as large as that on coal, <strong>and</strong> the impact on oil is smaller in 2010, but larger in 2020 than the<br />
impacts on coal or gas. This deserves some explanations.<br />
The implementation <strong>of</strong> the Kyoto policies increases user prices <strong>of</strong> fossil fuels through carbon <strong>and</strong><br />
energy levies, which depend on carbon <strong>and</strong> energy contents <strong>of</strong> the fuels. It is assumed that the<br />
main instrument <strong>of</strong> implementation <strong>of</strong> the Kyoto Protocol is tradable carbon permits, which are<br />
sold at a uniform price per unit <strong>of</strong> carbon throughout the Annex I region (with the exception <strong>of</strong><br />
Japan, which restricts trading <strong>and</strong> increases the domestic price <strong>of</strong> permits in 2010). Economic<br />
agents base their decisions on total domestic prices <strong>of</strong> energy, which are determined by producer<br />
prices, transport <strong>costs</strong>, domestic taxation (consumption taxes <strong>and</strong> input taxes), <strong>and</strong> carbon<br />
permits. Uniform prices <strong>of</strong> carbon permits affect the three fuels differently, because (a) initial<br />
domestic prices differ strongly whether we look at prices per unit <strong>of</strong> energy or prices per unit <strong>of</strong><br />
carbon; <strong>and</strong> (b) because <strong>of</strong> different elasticities <strong>of</strong> substitution between different fuels in<br />
production, <strong>and</strong> between goods in consumption, <strong>and</strong> because <strong>of</strong> different elasticities <strong>of</strong> dem<strong>and</strong><br />
with respect to consumer incomes.<br />
Figure 5 shows differences between prices for coal, refined oil, <strong>and</strong> gas as measured in energy<br />
<strong>and</strong> carbon units. Differences are shown in per cent <strong>of</strong> the gas prices for major Annex I regions.<br />
Positive bars show prices greater than the gas price, negative bars show that prices are below the<br />
gas price. The series in the foreground shows data for coal, the background series shows indices<br />
for refined oil. For each region the bars on the left show relative price indices per unit <strong>of</strong> energy,<br />
bars on the right show prices per unit <strong>of</strong> carbon. The figure shows clearly that in all regions<br />
refined oil is substantially more expensive than gas, <strong>and</strong> in most regions coal is cheaper than gas,<br />
<strong>and</strong> this general result holds both for prices per energy unit <strong>and</strong> for prices per carbon unit.<br />
46