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sectoral economic costs and benefits of ghg mitigation - IPCC

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Fossil Fuels<br />

fuel exporters should damages be incurred. Options reviewed include the use <strong>of</strong> emissions<br />

trading, the removal <strong>of</strong> fossil fuel subsidies, <strong>and</strong> the use <strong>of</strong> long-term investment strategies to<br />

broaden exporting countries’ <strong>economic</strong> portfolios.<br />

1 Introduction<br />

In the course <strong>of</strong> the negotiations <strong>of</strong> the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate<br />

Change, it became clear that one particular group <strong>of</strong> countries – those with a heavy reliance on<br />

the export <strong>of</strong> fossil fuels – perceived themselves at high risk from any possible actions taken to<br />

mitigate climate change. As a result <strong>of</strong> their intensive lobbying (<strong>and</strong> ultimately, agreement by<br />

negotiators) a number <strong>of</strong> Articles were included in the Climate Convention, <strong>and</strong> later the Kyoto<br />

Protocol, to reflect these concerns 1 . This paper seeks to address only the issue <strong>of</strong> impacts on<br />

fossil fuel exporters <strong>of</strong> climate change <strong>mitigation</strong> responses; it does not address other aspects <strong>of</strong><br />

climate change impacts, such as the possible <strong>benefits</strong> fossil fuel exporters might receive from<br />

climate change <strong>mitigation</strong> itself. Clearly, the total <strong>costs</strong> <strong>of</strong> any impacts would need to be<br />

appropriately adjusted to compensate for such omissions.<br />

From the perspective <strong>of</strong> these countries, historic precedent could be brought to bear: the present<br />

rates <strong>of</strong> taxation are applied differentially across the fossil fuels – with oil being taxed the most<br />

heavily (in its refined form), with coal production <strong>and</strong> consumption being taxed only weakly or<br />

even subsidized 2 . If pricing policy follows past patterns, it might thus be expected that national<br />

efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuels could again disproportionately affect<br />

the refined price <strong>of</strong> oil – although price elasticities suggest that such additional taxes may not be<br />

particularly effective in reducing consumption. Conversely, if a carbon per unit <strong>of</strong> energy link is<br />

the basis for reductions (a much more cost-effective approach), coal will feel the brunt <strong>of</strong> the<br />

effort.<br />

It is impossible to accurately assess the validity <strong>of</strong> this concern; future policy actions cannot be<br />

definitively known. However, a more detailed look at the mechanisms used to assess climate<br />

<strong>mitigation</strong> impacts, <strong>and</strong> possible policy approaches that might be used to reduce climate changecausing<br />

emissions could shed some light on this question. For example, the overall <strong>economic</strong><br />

<strong>costs</strong> <strong>of</strong> mitigating climate change are largely based on models which use a carbon tax as a proxy<br />

for the policies <strong>and</strong> measures that might be needed to mitigate climate change – <strong>and</strong> assume that<br />

such a tax would be imposed on all carbon emissions at an equal level (See box on Economic<br />

Models, p. 3).<br />

Inasmuch as the sensitivity to price is not equal, a greater effect in any given sector might be<br />

gained through a differential application <strong>of</strong> such a tax – e.g., resetting overall tax levels based on<br />

carbon content rather than only establishing an additional or supplemental carbon tax. Clearly<br />

such an approach would substantially alter the impacts that might be felt in any given sector. If<br />

the goal is to reduce carbon most efficiently, such an approach might also lower the overall <strong>costs</strong><br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>mitigation</strong>. Given that most models do not assume tax restructuring, they are almost certainly<br />

giving an inflated estimate <strong>of</strong> <strong>costs</strong>.<br />

1 See Appendix for texts <strong>of</strong> the relevant Articles from the Convention (4.8 <strong>and</strong> 4.9) <strong>and</strong> the Kyoto Protocol<br />

(2.3 <strong>and</strong> 3.14). Note that the agreement on these texts reflects the fact that climate change impacts, both<br />

from response strategies, but also from climate change itself, are to be considered. This text was<br />

incorporated only after a comprehensive list <strong>of</strong> countries facing possible impacts was agreed, including not<br />

only fossil fuel exporters, but also small isl<strong>and</strong> countries, countries with low-lying coastal areas, countries<br />

with areas prone to drought <strong>and</strong> desertification, <strong>and</strong> an array <strong>of</strong> others.<br />

2 For example taxes on fossil fuels within the IEA countries range from 4.8% (UK) to 29% (Finl<strong>and</strong>) <strong>of</strong> the<br />

consumer price for gas, 39% (US) to 85% (UK) for oil, <strong>and</strong> 1.2% (Switzerl<strong>and</strong>) to 48% (Finl<strong>and</strong>) for coal.<br />

86

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