sectoral economic costs and benefits of ghg mitigation - IPCC
sectoral economic costs and benefits of ghg mitigation - IPCC
sectoral economic costs and benefits of ghg mitigation - IPCC
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Jonathan Pershing<br />
global oversupply <strong>and</strong> reduced dem<strong>and</strong> due to climate change <strong>mitigation</strong> actions 1 , revenue losses<br />
for South Africa <strong>and</strong> Indonesia could be as much as 4% <strong>and</strong> 1% <strong>of</strong> their GNP, respectively.<br />
However, it should also be noted that the spot market prices for coal has already fluctuated more<br />
than this amount without climate policies – suggesting that exporting countries have already<br />
developed mechanisms to cope with such changes. Furthermore, in none <strong>of</strong> the non-Annex I coal<br />
exporting countries are coal exports a substantial share <strong>of</strong> GDP; thus it seems likely that<br />
additional emphasis on other elements <strong>of</strong> national economies could <strong>of</strong>fset any losses in this<br />
sector.<br />
The local environmental impacts <strong>of</strong> coal combustion must also be considered when evaluating<br />
long-term coal dem<strong>and</strong>. While enormous strides have been made in the most modern coal fired<br />
plants with respect to emissions <strong>of</strong> sulfur, particulates <strong>and</strong> nitrous oxides, coal-fired power<br />
generation still accounts for a substantial share <strong>of</strong> local pollution in much <strong>of</strong> the world – <strong>and</strong> may<br />
ultimately lead to a reduction in coal-fired generation even absent other factors.<br />
Perhaps most important from the perspective <strong>of</strong> the long-term viability <strong>of</strong> coal in the generation<br />
<strong>of</strong> power is the issue <strong>of</strong> cost: where natural gas supply is available, the fuel <strong>of</strong> choice for new<br />
electricity generation is gas. It is less costly to build <strong>and</strong>, if supply is available, to operate.<br />
In combination, these policy <strong>and</strong> price issues have driven many governments as well as many<br />
private sector power plant operators, for reasons entirely independent <strong>of</strong> climate change, to<br />
consider other power generation alternatives to coal – including not only natural gas, but also<br />
renewables <strong>and</strong>, in some countries, to nuclear. This in part explains the long-term decline in the<br />
use <strong>of</strong> coal as a primary generation source in much <strong>of</strong> the OECD.<br />
In spite <strong>of</strong> such trends, a number <strong>of</strong> factors also suggest that coal could make a comeback. The<br />
enormous reserves <strong>of</strong> coal in China, India <strong>and</strong> North America – each countries with significant<br />
anticipated energy dem<strong>and</strong> growth over the next century – <strong>and</strong> the low <strong>costs</strong> <strong>of</strong> power generation<br />
from coal fired combustion make it an attractive long term power source. In addition, because <strong>of</strong><br />
the large scale <strong>and</strong> high degree <strong>of</strong> centralization <strong>of</strong> coal fired power, CO 2 emissions from coal<br />
plants may prove the most amenable to capture <strong>and</strong> long term storage – ultimately removing the<br />
climate threat the fuel might pose.<br />
Oil & Gas<br />
Approximately 50 percent <strong>of</strong> total world oil production is exported. Considering the ratio <strong>of</strong> oil<br />
production to reserves (see Table 4), however, it may suggest that in the next 20 - 25 years, a<br />
number <strong>of</strong> regions will have consumed nearly all <strong>of</strong> their current reserves 2 . This suggests that the<br />
distribution <strong>of</strong> exports is likely to shift significantly. In particular, North America, Europe, the<br />
Former Soviet Union <strong>and</strong> the Asia-Pacific region are likely to substantially deplete their current<br />
oil reserves – leaving at least their current supply <strong>of</strong> 1.7 thous<strong>and</strong> million tons per year (nearly<br />
50% <strong>of</strong> current production) to be filled by increasing production from the remaining regions.<br />
These numbers do not account for growth in dem<strong>and</strong> as a consequence <strong>of</strong> <strong>economic</strong> growth –<br />
although they also do not account for any policies that might be taken to mitigate climate change.<br />
The IEA’s World Energy Outlook predicts oil dem<strong>and</strong> increasing from 72 million barrels/day (in<br />
1996) to 95 million barrels/day in 2010. If this global increase is allocated evenly to the top ten<br />
1 Note that Warwick McKibben <strong>and</strong> Petrer Wilcoxen in “Permit Trading Under the Kyoto Protocol”<br />
suggest that coal consumption in Japan, the world’s largest importer, declines by approximately 43% in a<br />
no-trading case, <strong>and</strong> approximately 24% in a trading case. Price shifts might be expected to be less.<br />
2 It is clear from the literature that reserves <strong>of</strong> fossil fuels are difficult to ascertain. Uncertainty estimates<br />
for many regions are quite high (e.g., see USGS, Masters et al, 1999, see web-site<br />
http://energy.er.usgs.gov/ products/papers/WPC/14/text/ht). Nonetheless, a general trend as outlined here<br />
does seem to be supported in most analyses.<br />
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