DIPLOMACY ДИПЛОМАЦИЯ

ПРОМЕНЯЩИЯТ СЕ ЯДРЕН РЕД В АЗИЯ
2015.
15. Phillip Karber, ‘Strategic implications of China’s underground great wall’, PowerPoint презентация, 26 септември
2011, онлайн.
16. Wu Riqiang, Issues in Sino-US nuclear relations: survivability, coercion and escalation, Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, London, 21 юни 2013, онлайн.
17. Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘The evolution of interstate security crisis-management theory and practise in China’,
Naval War College Review, 2016, 69(1):28–71.
18. See Ralph Cossa, Brad Glosserman, David Santoro, ‘US–China strategic nuclear relations: time to move
to Track-1 dialogue’, Issues and Insights, 2015, 15(7), Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International
Studies.
19. William Maclean, ‘Iran seeks banned nuclear items, uses Chinese trader for missile parts: US’, Reuters, 17
март 2014, онлайн.
20. David Albright, Andrea Stricker, Donald Stewart, Serial proliferator Karl Li, Institute for Science and International
Security, 8 май 2014.
21. Roberts, The case for US nuclear weapons in the 21st century, стр. 159–160
22. William Perry, ‘William J Perry on nuclear war and nuclear terrorism’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 8 декември
2015.
23. Thomas Reed, Danny Stillman, The nuclear express: a political history of the bomb and its proliferation, Zenith
Press, Minneapolis, 2009, стр. 252.
24. Gaurav Kampani, ‘The challenges of nuclear operationalization and strategic stability’, в: A Tellis, AM Denmark,
T Tanner (eds), Strategic Asia 2013–14: Asia in the second nuclear age, 2013, стр. 101.
25. Kanti Bajpai, ‘India’s nuclear posture after Pokhran II’, International Studies, New Delhi, 2000, 37:4.
26. Ashley Tellis, India’s emerging nuclear posture: between recessed deterrent and ready arsenal, RAND, Santa
Monica, California, 2001, стр. 5.
27. Anwar Iqbal, ‘Tactical N-arms to ward off war threat, says FO’, Dawn, 20 октомври 2015, онлайн.
28. Kurshid Khan, Limited war under the nuclear umbrella and its implications for South Asia, Stimson Center,
2012, онлайн.
29. Toby Dalton, George Perkovich, India’s nuclear options and escalation dominance, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, май 2016, онлайн.
30. David Albright, Serena Kelleher-Vergantini, India’s stocks of civil and military plutonium and highly enriched
uranium, end 2014, Institute for Science and International Security, 2 ноември 2015.
31. Paul Kerr, Mary Beth Nitikin, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, US Congressional Research Service, RL34248, 12
февруари 2016, онлайн.
32. Споразумение съгласно Параграф 123 от Закона за атомната енергия на Съединените щати от 1954 г.,
включващо участие на САЩ в ядрени сделки с други страни.
33. Toby Dalton, Michael Krepon, A normal nuclear Pakistan, Stimson Center and Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2015, онлайн.
34. William Walker, A perpetual menace: nuclear weapons and international order, Routledge Global Security
Studies, 2011, стр. 8.
35. Kerr and Nikitin, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, стр. 16.
36. Kampani, Strategic Asia 2013–14, стр. 104.
37. US Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on the US Pacific Command and US Forces Korea, 16 април
2015, онлайн.
38. Siegfried Hecker, ‘The real threat from North Korea is the nuclear arsenal built over the last decade’, Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists, 7 януари 2015, онлайн.
39. Joel Wit, Sun Young Ahn (2015) North Korea’s nuclear futures: technology and strategy, US–Korea Institute
at SAIS, 2015, онлайн.
40. Виж, R Scott Kemp, Centrifuges: a new era for nuclear proliferation, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center,
Washington DC, 5 юни 2012, онлайн.
41. Richard Smart, ‘North Korea will not use nuclear weapons first, says Kim Jong-un’, The Guardian, 8 май 2016.
42. Choe Sang-Hun, ‘North Korea’s Kim Jong-un tells military to have nuclear warheads on standby’, New York
Times, 3 март 2016.
43. David Santoro and John Warden argue in favour of such a schematic, albeit with slightly different labels, in
their article, ‘America’s delicate dance between deterrence and assurance’, The National Interest, 1 февруари
2016, онлайн.
44. Според теоремата на Хейли, заплахите за използване на ядрено оръжие е достатъчно да са само 5%
правдоподобни, за да възпрат един противник, но трябва да са 95% правдоподобни, за да успокоят
един съюзник.
45. Brad Roberts, ‘Extended deterrence and strategic stability in Northeast Asia’, National Institute for Defense
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