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epilogue: the econoMic crisis<br />

groups have imposed self-regulation on the sector (corporate social<br />

responsibility) or the privatisation of certain public information and<br />

supervisory functions through the use of auditors and rating<br />

companies, thus avoiding democratic meddling in their economic<br />

authoritarianism. hence, given that the crisis will eventually end, an<br />

important premise would be to ascertain the criteria with which<br />

economic activities will be regulated, what goals will be pursued,<br />

what the (more or less democratic) institutional framework under<br />

which such things will be decided will look like and, particularly,<br />

whose interests will be furthered by the outcome of this intervention<br />

(see case study 100).<br />

Case study 100. The crisis as an opportunity to change the economic model. - Óscar carpintero<br />

Reorganisation of property ownership and the financial system in an “economy of acquisition”<br />

one of the balsams used to placate criticism of the neo-liberal rules of the game has been to claim that their<br />

application promoted economic growth. however, going beyond the serious shortcomings of the gDp as an indicator of<br />

population well-being, growth in the production of goods and services hides a vast, planet-wide process of wealth and<br />

corporate asset acquisition. large-scale extraction of riches in the form of energy and non-renewable raw materials has<br />

meant that rich countries have ceased to be “production” economies and have instead become economies of “acquisition”.<br />

to do so, they have used two powerful instruments: international trade and the financial system. the former al<strong>low</strong>s over<br />

2,000 million tons of energy and raw materials annually, a quantity which increases yearly, to f<strong>low</strong> away from the rest of the<br />

world and into rich countries. the latter reinforces the acquisitive nature of “developed” economies (naredo & valero, 1999;<br />

carpintero, 2005), since the financial world also has an impact on economic assessment, thus redistributing both the<br />

financing and purchasing power of economic agents with regard to not only goods but also companies and territories. thus,<br />

along with the cheap importation of energy and raw materials, over the last two decades there has been an increase in<br />

acquisitions of companies that extract and export energy and raw materials destined for rich countries. these countries’<br />

transnational companies, thanks to the liberalisation of international financial markets, have taken advantage of successive<br />

waves of transnational mergers and acquisitions in order to gain control of a large part of the world’s corporate assets,<br />

leading to a vertiginous and unprecedented planet-wide reorganisation of property ownership.<br />

a global analysis of foreign direct investment (FDi) shows that such investment is mostly a matter of the acquisition or<br />

simple purchase of existing companies (either between rich countries, or between companies from rich and poor countries)<br />

and not of investment in installations or economic activities that create employment and increase production and income in<br />

the host country. the last decade has seen a growth of investment in extractive industries in poor countries, where levels of<br />

FDi stocks are consequently very high. some examples include nigeria (74% in extraction mining), botswana (68%), bolivia<br />

(70%), venezuela (almost 40%), chile and argentina (each around 30%) (united nations conference on trade and<br />

Development, 2007). Moreover, trans-national companies control mining extraction and commercialisation completely in<br />

countries such as Mali, tanzania, guinea, botswana, gabon, namibia, Zambia and argentina, and have very high levels of<br />

control in colombia, peru and chile. in fact, the expansion of the so-called “new economy” has largely been possible due to<br />

the acquisition of company assets in sectors closely related to the utilisation and commercialisation of natural resources<br />

(examples include electricity, gas and water production and distribution or oil extraction and refining industries), as well as<br />

the fact that africa and latin america have supplied strategically important minerals needed by the new information and<br />

communications technologies (carpintero, 2004). For instance, the large-scale manufacture and consumption of computer<br />

monitors, hard discs, cellular telephones, electronic components, integrated circuit boards, condensers and so on would<br />

not have been possible without the gold, platinum, palladium, rhodium, ruthenium, iridium, tantalum, columbium, and<br />

magnesium mined in africa (between 65% and 75% of imports of these substances going to oecD countries). it should also<br />

be pointed out that the rich countries themselves, in order to control poor countries’ natural resources, provoke or prolong<br />

wars and conflicts (for example, oil drives conflicts in nigeria, coltan in the Democratic republic of congo; Klare, 2003).<br />

Many times, a large part of this process has been financed thanks to so-called “finance money” (naredo, 2000), thus giving<br />

companies enormous power and control in establishing the rules of the game, which tend to increase social inequalities.<br />

365

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