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EMploYMEnt, work, And hEAlth inEquAlitiEs - a global perspective<br />

The very high OPEC oil price that came with the oil embargo of 1973<br />

placed vast amounts of financial power at the disposal of states such as Saudi<br />

Arabia or Kuwait. While the US was actively preparing to invade these<br />

countries to restore the f<strong>low</strong> of oil and bring down oil prices, the Saudis<br />

agreed, presumably under military pressure if not open threat from the US,<br />

to recycle all of their petrodollars through New York investment banks and<br />

then throughout the world. New York investment banks became even more<br />

active internationally, focusing less on direct investment, an issue which<br />

required a strategy of liberalisation of international credit and financial<br />

markets. Large corporations became more and more financial in their<br />

orientation, even when they were engaged in production. The interests of<br />

owners and managers were fused by paying the latter in stock options. Stock<br />

values, rather than production, became the guiding light of economic activity,<br />

and financial interests gained the upper hand within the ruling classes. Neoliberalism<br />

meant the "financialisation of everything" and the relocation of the<br />

power centre of capital accumulation to owners and their financial<br />

institutions at the expense of other factions of capital (see Case study 1). The<br />

support of financial institutions and the integrity of the financial system<br />

became then the central concern of neo-liberal states (such as the G7) that<br />

increasingly dominated global politics (Harvey, 2005).<br />

Case Study 1. Globalisation, financial markets and employment. - ted schrecker<br />

"Financialisation" is among the dominant characteristics of today's global economic system (epstein, 2005). while the total<br />

value of foreign direct investment (to build new production facilities and acquire ownership of existing assets) in 2006 was us$1.2<br />

trillion, the daily value of "traditional" foreign exchange transactions on the world's financial markets is now estimated at us$3.2<br />

trillion, not including a variety of financial derivatives, the market for which is growing even more rapidly.<br />

Financial crises resulting from large outf<strong>low</strong>s of hypermobile short-term capital can reduce the value of a country's currency by 50<br />

percent or more and result in economic contractions that push millions of people into poverty and economic insecurity. this is what<br />

happened in Mexico in 1994-95, several south asian countries in 1997-98, and argentina in 2001-2002. the damage done by financial<br />

crises in terms of lost gdp and employment can be substantial. For example, griffith-Jones and gottschalk (2006) estimate the cost of<br />

the asian financial crisis to the affected economies at us$917 billion over the period 1997-2002. effects on the economically vulnerable<br />

are compounded by public sector revenue losses and austerity measures often demanded by financial markets or the international<br />

Monetary Fund (iMF) as the price of restoring "investor confidence." Furthermore, a comparison of financial crises in 10 countries (van<br />

der hoeven & lübker, 2005) showed that employment tends to recover much more s<strong>low</strong>ly than gdp in the aftermath. Fol<strong>low</strong>ing the<br />

collapse of the Mexican peso, the then-managing director of the iMF described the underlying power dynamic in terms of "market<br />

perceptions: whether the country's policies are deemed basically sound and its economic future, promising. the corollary is that shifts<br />

in the market's perception of these underlying fundamentals can be quite swift, brutal, and destabilising" (camdessus, 1995).<br />

even governments committed to reducing economic privation and stimulating employment often hesitate to displease financial<br />

markets. For example, investor concern about policies that might be adopted by the workers' party in brazil (in advance of the 2002<br />

elections) and the african national congress in south africa (after democratisation) reduced the value of the country's currency by<br />

roughly 40 per cent in each case. at least temporarily, the governments in question accepted high unemployment and limited social<br />

expenditure -- in the brazilian case, in the form of a program of reforms dictated by the iMF -- rather than risk further depreciation<br />

of their currencies (evans, 2005; Koelble & lipuma, 2006). in south africa, the result was "dismal development and excellent<br />

macroeconomic outcomes" (streak, 2004) with the former including negative employment growth in every year between 1996 and<br />

2000 and an official unemployment rate of over 30 per cent; unofficial unemployment rates, using a broader measure, were and are<br />

considerably higher (Kingdon & Knight, 2005).<br />

even high-income countries are affected by the need to maintain "credibility" with financial markets. in contrast to the managed<br />

exchange rate environment that permitted expansionary full employment policies in the 1960s, "[t]he demands of credibility … imposed<br />

broadly deflationary macroeconomic strategies on the g7," at least through the early 1990s (eatwell, 1995: 297). writing about the<br />

oecd as a whole, eatwell argues that neither technological change nor competition from newly industrialising countries provide<br />

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