RESPONSIBLE ENTREPRENEURSHIP VISION DEVELOPMENT AND ETHICS

166 RESPONSIBLE ENTREPRENEURSHIP
a departure from an outdated, bureaucratic public management and an attempt of gaining legitimacy
across society (Risher, 1999; Perry, 2009; Bellé, 2010).
Contrary to what one would have thought, public sector employees in Greece are far from
unanimously negative regarding the adoption of performance contingent pay. However, they
seem to “delegate” the opposition to others around them, in an apparent effort to signal a proefficiency
own attitude but a more conservative view on this by others. This could be explained
as the wish to comply with some objectively correct measure, which would face objections
by others.
The explanatory factors of own attitudes towards performance contingent pay are similar
from beliefs on others’ attitudes in the following ways: that a PRP system will help the
workforce to improve its productivity, it will have a positive effect on wage, however it could
demotivate public employees that are intrinsically stimulated.
Moreover, workers have heterogeneous attitudes and hold heterogeneous beliefs on others’
expectations regarding that a PRP system will help public employees to better understand
the organization values and priorities, and that after the implementation of such schemes public
servants will be interested solely in tasks that are directly related to financial incentives.
Note
1
EKDDA is the national strategic agent for the development of the Human Resources of the Public Administration
and Local Government. One of his missions is to provide life-long learning and certified training
on knowledge and skills on public servants.
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