Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

FROM GUNS TO MISSILES
1953, the rate decreased to 11.1 aircraft per 1,000 sorties.
Analysts attributed 19 percent of the decrease to the altitude
policy and a further 32 percent to target diversification. As a
counterpoint, the Fifth Air Force removed the altitude restriction
for two weeks in June 1953 and suffered the consequences.
During that month, the unit suffered its highest 1953 monthly
losses—18 aircraft to ground fire, including 12 of its newest jet
fighter-bombers, the F-86F. 15
Another policy adopted by the Fifth Air Force in June 1952
limited the time over the target. It mandated that, with the exception
of air defense and F4U aircraft, pilots were to make
only one run over a target for each type of external ordnance
carried; and it forbade strafing. In August 1952, the Fifth Air
Force modified the policy by restricting general support and
interdiction missions to one pass and CAS to two passes. 16
American Airmen also employed more direct methods
against enemy AAA. The Marines tried flak-suppression tactics
in late 1951 or early 1952, with spotter aircraft temporarily diverting
strike aircraft to hit flak positions. In June 1952, the
Marines published a procedure that put suppressive fire on
flak positions 30 seconds before their aircraft began divebombing
runs. Thereafter, Marine aircraft losses dropped. 17
At about the same time, the Army and Air Force adopted
similar tactics, although there is no indication that there was
any coordination between the three services. Before July 1952,
the Army and Air Force operated under procedures established
in plan NEGAT, which curtailed friendly artillery fire
during an air strike and restricted almost all artillery fire
within a 2,500-yard radius of the target. Friendly guns would
mark targets with smoke or white phosphorous shells and, between
the time the spotter aircraft left the area and the fighterbombers
arrived, would fire against known antiaircraft positions.
Prompted by the loss of two C-119s to American artillery
fire in June 1951, the policy emphasized safety from friendly
fire. However, the policy satisfied neither Airmen nor soldiers
and became even less acceptable to both as the Communists
burrowed deeper into the ground, brought up more flak
pieces, and learned American air-support procedures. Not only
did fighter-bomber losses remain high, but the procedures left
78