Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS
but modified D models and 99 of the later G models. Only half
of the G models had upgraded ECM equipment, which proved
to be one of the critical factors in determining which aircraft
the SAMs hit, the big killers of the B-52s. 44 Although the defenders
fired more SAMs at the B-52Ds, more B-52Gs were hit
and downed, with five destroyed on the first three missions.
A second problem was that the B-52s were controlled, or
better put, overcontrolled, from SAC headquarters in Omaha.
SAC formed the basic battle plan and tactics literally thousands
of miles from the actual combat. Initially, SAC had a policy of no
maneuvers on the bomb run, although such maneuvers often
permitted aircraft to elude the SAMs. 45 SAC also mandated a
“press-on” procedure, which dictated that bombers continue
their missions despite the loss of engines, computers, and most
critically, ECM equipment. 46 Not surprisingly, with one headquarters
controlling the bombers and another the support aircraft,
there were coordination problems between the bombers
and their escorts, including two instances in which B-52s fired
on US aircraft. 47 Other coordination difficulties included US
radios jammed by EB-66 ECM and friendly radar severely degraded
by B-52 ECM. 48
Losses indicated that the ECM was inadequate. First, B-52
ECM protection markedly declined in the 100-degree turn immediately
after bomb release, as the bombers’ bank reduced
the effectiveness of the spot jammers. 49 Second, winds that
differed from forecasts in direction and speed upset the ECM
protection of the chaff corridors. For example, on 20 December,
only four of 27 B-52 cells received chaff protection at the
bomb-release line, and all of the B-52s downed were 5 to 10
miles from chaff cover. Third, the North Vietnamese gunners
surprised the American Airmen by using radar designed and
deployed for gun control (designated T8209) to guide the SA-2s.
American Airmen lacked equipment to both warn of and jam
this “new” I-band radar. 50
The North Vietnamese took advantage of the stereotyped tactics
by salvoing barrages of SAMs at the point where the B-52s
executed their post-target turns. SAM operators limited radar
guidance to the last five to 10 seconds of intercept, which made
133