Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE THROUGH WORLD WAR II
Arnhem, the Netherlands, in September 1944, and the German
attack on Allied airfields in January 1945.
A third lesson that can be gleaned from the war is that the
Airmen came up with countermeasures to AAA that would be
standard for the future. The Airmen attempted to avoid areas
of flak concentrations by flying irregular courses in the face of
ground fire, by flying only one pass over the target, and by using
both the sun and terrain for maximum protection. They also
employed chaff and jammers to degrade radar equipment, especially
during the night or in poor weather. Finally, the Airmen
attacked the guns directly. However, in most aircraft-versusgun
duels, the gunners held the advantage. Combat experience
indicated that pitting a highly trained pilot and an expensive
aircraft against a less-trained crew and less-valuable
gun made little sense.
Fourth, rapidly evolving technology tilted the offensivedefensive
balance in favor of the defense. Radar was the first
and most important piece of equipment. It overturned the theories
of Douhet and others (such as instructors and students at
the Air Corps Tactical School), who believed that the bomber
would always get through, cause decisive damage, and suffer
sustainable losses. Electronic countermeasures somewhat
nullified defensive radar, but radar still gave the defenders
early warning and more accurate aiming information than was
previously available. Radar gave the defenders much greater
capabilities in night and bad weather conditions as well. The
proximity fuze gave another big boost to the defenders, increasing
the effectiveness of the guns by a multiple of five or
so. One technological advance that was in the development
stage but did not see service during the war was the flak
rocket. This device was capable of reaching altitudes well above
that of the highest-flying World War II bombers, and, fitted
with a proximity fuze, would have inflicted heavy casualties on
the bomber formations.
Fifth, flak proved very cost-effective, downing hostile aircraft
at a relatively low cost. However, flak effectiveness should be
measured by more than kills. Ground fire complicated the Airman’s
task, forcing him to fly more sorties, carry additional
equipment, and adopt additional procedures, all of which de-
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