Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
ment to curtail ABM deployment. McNamara told the Russians
that limitations on defensive weapons were necessary to avoid
an arms race. In response, the Soviet leader pounded the table
and angrily replied: “Defense is moral, offense is immoral!” 33
Pressure on the administration mounted shortly thereafter when
the Chinese announced they had detonated a hydrogen bomb.
A few days after the Glassboro meeting, Johnson told McNamara
that he would approve deployment. 34
In September 1967, McNamara delivered a key speech in San
Francisco. Although he made clear that an ABM defense against
a Soviet ICBM attack was both futile and expensive, the secretary
of defense announced that the United States would deploy
a “light” ABM system to protect the United States from a
Chinese attack. 35 Another purpose of the US ABM system was to
protect US (Minuteman) ICBMs and the United States against
an accidental ICBM launch. The system would consist of the
Spartan area defense and Sprint terminal defense of 25 major
cities. The system would be known as Sentinel and cost an estimated
$4–$5 billion. 36
ABM supporters had won a significant victory and thought
the way was now clear. But if politics played an important role
in bringing this about, the politics of the times played a role in
derailing, or at least deflecting, ABM deployment. Citizen groups
rose to oppose siting of the missiles in and around the major
cities in which they lived. This was unexpected, as public opinion
polls indicated that the public (the 40 percent of the public who
expressed an opinion) supported ABM deployment by a margin
of almost two to one. The problem was the classic one of
“not in my backyard.” Stimulated by the activism and antiestablishment
wave of the late 1960s and supported by the
leadership and advice of numerous articulate, activist, and
passionate scientists and academics, a protest movement upset
the administration’s and proponent’s plans. Another, albeit less
pervasive factor, was that intelligence agencies downgraded
the threat of Chinese ICBMs to the United States. 37
Meanwhile, diplomatic efforts continued. In July 1968,
President Johnson announced that talks with the Soviets would
begin in September, but the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia
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