Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

FROM GUNS TO MISSILES
A. H. Peterson et al., “Aircraft Vulnerability in World War II,” RAND Report
RM-402, rev. July 1950 (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1950), fig. 13, AUL.
11. Pacific Fleet Evaluation Group, research memorandum, “The Relative
Risk to Anti-Aircraft Fire for Jet and Propeller Driven Ground Attack Aircraft in
Korea,” March 1952, NHC; Robert Futrell, “United States Air Force Operations
in the Korean Conflict: 25 June–1 November 1950,” USAF Historical
Study 71 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: USAF Historical Division, Air University,
1952), 57, HRA.
12. “FEAF Report on Korean War,” 128; and Fifth Air Force Intelligence
Summary, 15 September 1952, 26, HRA.
13. Futrell, Historical Study 127, 152; Fifth Air Force, Operations Analysis
Office, operations analysis memorandum, “A Survey of Fighter Bomber Tactics
and Flak Losses,” January 1952, 7, HRA; Pat Meid and James Yingling, US
Marine Corps Operations in Korea 1950–1953, vol. 5, Operations in West Korea
(Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, US Marine Corps, 1972), 64, 69.
14. Futrell, Historical Study 127, 152; and Meid and Yingling, US Marine
Corps Operations, 5:70.
15. Futrell, Historical Study 127, 152–53.
16. Meid and Yingling, US Marine Corps Operations, 5:70, 492n.
17. Ibid., 70–72.
18. Futrell, Historical Study 127, 219–22; History, Far East Air Forces,
July–December 1952, vol. 1:58, HRA; and “FEAF Report on Korean War,” 39.
19. Another reason for the nonuse of ECM was that insufficient jamming
power could be generated by the relatively small number of B-29s involved
and the shortages of both trained operators and equipment. See Daniel
Kuehl, “The Radar Eye Blinded: The USAF and Electronic Warfare,
1945–1955” (PhD diss., Duke University, 1992), 131, 134, 151–52, 157–58.
20. Another problem was that the targets were located very close to the
Yalu River and thus were covered by Chinese guns that could not be suppressed.
See Kuehl, “The Radar Eye Blinded,” 150–51; and A. Timothy
Warnock, ed., The USAF in Korea: A Chronology, 1950–53 (Maxwell AFB,
Ala.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2000), 75.
21. Futrell, Historical Study 71, 116; “FEAF Report on Korean War,” 39–41,
128–33; memorandum from Thomas Power to Gen James Knapp, subject:
Commanders’ Conference, Patrick Air Force Base, Fla., 30 September–1 October
1957, 4 October 1957, 2; and “Strategic Air Command Participation
in the Missile Program from March 1957 through December 1957,” USAF
Historical Study 70, vol. 2, HRA.
22. The missile had two sets of fins: the forward four spanning 23 inches
and the rearward four measuring 52 inches. Overall, the missile measured
19.5 feet in length and had a maximum diameter of 12 inches that tapered
to 8 inches at the base. See Bell Laboratories and Douglas Aircraft, “Project
Nike: History of Development,” April 1954, 1, 2, 7, 13, 16, R; and Mary
Cagle, “Development, Production, and Deployment of the Nike Ajax Guided
Missile System, 1945–1959,” June 1959, 3–5, 30, R.
23. Bell Labs, 17, 20, 29–30, 76; and Cagle, “Nike Ajax,” 37–39, 54.
108