Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS
D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 1975–1979), 142, 197; Nordeen, Air Warfare,
64; G. H. Turley, “Time of Change in Modern Warfare,” Marine Corps Gazette,
December 1974, 18; CNA, “Documentation and Analysis of US Marine Corps
Activity in Southeast Asia: 1 April–31 July 1972,” 1:110, 1:111, Marine Corps
Historical Center; and Lake and Hartman, “Air Electronic Warfare,” 47.
32. Doglione, Airpower and the 1972 Spring Invasion, 132; Berger et al.,
The USAF in Southeast Asia, 168; Nordeen, Air Warfare, 64; House of Representatives,
Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
93d Cong., 1st sess., 9 January 1973, 10; and CNA, “Summary of
Air Operations in Southeast Asia: January 1972–31 January 1973,”
OEG/OP508N, January 1974, 4-17, 4-19.
33. Seymour Hersh, The Price of Power—Kissinger in the Nixon White
House (New York: Summit Books, 1983), 506; and Richard Nixon, RN: The
Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosser & Dunlap, 1976), 606–7.
34. Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (New York: Oxford University,
1978), 410; and Hersh, The Price of Power, 526.
35. TAC, “SEA Tactics Review Brochure,” 11, 68.
36. Guided weapons were expensive, limited by the weather, and few in
number. See Directorate of Operations Analysis, Headquarters Pacific Air
Forces, Project Contemporary Historical Examination of Current Operations
Report, “Linebacker: Overview of the First 120 Days,” 27 September 1973,
21, 27, AUL; and Nordeen, Air Warfare, 59, 63. One problem encountered
with the ECM pods was that they created interference with the electro-optical
guided bomb (EOGB) guidance system. A wire screen quickly solved that
problem. See Patrick Breitling, “Guided Bomb Operations in SEA: The
Weather Dimensions, 1 February–31 December 1972,” Contemporary Historical
Examination of Current Operations Report, 1 October 1973, 3, 24,
AUL; Jeffery Rhodes, “Improving the Odds on Ground Attack,” Air Force
Magazine, November 1986, 48; Delbert Corum et al., The Tale of Two Bridges,
monograph 1 in USAF Southeast Asia Monograph Series, ed., Arthur J. C.
Lavalle (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 1975–1979), 85–86;
and Morita, “Implications of Modern Air Power,” 6.
37. Michel, Clashes, 222; Momyer, Air Power in Three Wars, 129; Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam, “Linebacker Study”; Nordeen, Air Warfare, 24;
and Senate Committee on Armed Services, Hearing on Fiscal Year 1974 Authorization,
92d Cong., 2d sess., 13–20 March 1973, pt. 6:4275.
38. TAC, “SEA Tactics Review Brochure,” 11, 78. During the period of 10
May through 10 September 1972, the United States lost 63 fixed-wing aircraft
in combat over the north: 21 to AAA, 22 to MiGs, and 20 to SAMs.
39. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, “Uncoordinated Draft,” 7,
chap. 8; Burbage, “Battle for the Skies,” 267; Directorate of Operations
Analysis, “Linebacker,” 70–72; DOD, Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense, “US Aircraft Losses in SE Asia,” October 1973, table 351, 5; R. Mark
Clodfelter, “By Other Means: An Analysis of the Linebacker Bombing Campaigns
as Instruments of National Policy” (master’s thesis, University of
143