14.07.2014 Views

Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE IN THE 1990S<br />

aboard 22 Aegis ships in less than five years, for an initial cost<br />

<strong>of</strong> $3 billion. However, a Navy estimate for a 12-ship system was<br />

$15 billion, while later estimates for such a system were between<br />

$16 billion and $19 billion. A sea-based NMD would violate<br />

the ABM treaty. 31<br />

The attractiveness <strong>of</strong> the Navy system was evident in 1999.<br />

In September, the Japanese agreed <strong>to</strong> conduct joint research<br />

with the United States for the NTW system. The two partners<br />

intend <strong>to</strong> jointly deploy a Block II Standard, with an undetermined<br />

IOC. The next month, naval representatives from the<br />

United States, Australia, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands<br />

met <strong>to</strong> investigate a future cooperative naval effort. The Standard<br />

missile figured prominently in these talks. 32<br />

To jump a bit ahead <strong>of</strong> the chronology, the election <strong>of</strong><br />

George W. Bush <strong>to</strong> the presidency in 2000 renewed interest in<br />

the Navy BMD programs. Bush, Senate Majority leader Trent<br />

Lott, Secretary <strong>of</strong> State Colin Powell, and former secretary <strong>of</strong><br />

state Henry Kissinger all called for the deployment <strong>of</strong> a seabased<br />

system. 33<br />

A New Threat<br />

One reason for this increased activity was the recognition <strong>of</strong><br />

an increased threat. Following the collapse <strong>of</strong> the Soviet Union<br />

and the overwhelming military vic<strong>to</strong>ry in the Gulf War in the<br />

early 1990s, Americans relaxed, expected a peace dividend,<br />

and believed they were secure. They also began <strong>to</strong> cut the military.<br />

The politicians were also lulled by a 1995 national intelligence<br />

estimate (NIE) and the intelligence community’s March<br />

1998 annual report that held that it would take 15 years for a<br />

country without a ballistic missile infrastructure <strong>to</strong> deploy an<br />

ICBM. This would give the United States ample warning before<br />

such a deployment. 34 Critics noted that this estimate ignored<br />

the existing Russian and Chinese ICBMs, turned a blind eye<br />

<strong>to</strong> the vulnerability <strong>of</strong> Alaska and Hawaii, and disregarded<br />

missile and missile technology transfer.<br />

This complacent view was jarred by events in the summer <strong>of</strong><br />

1998. First, a congressionally mandated committee chaired by<br />

former Secretary <strong>of</strong> Defense Donald Rumsfeld concluded that<br />

248

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!