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Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

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Chapter 6<br />

<strong>Ground</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Air</strong> Defense since 1990:<br />

The Gulf, the Balkans, and Afghanistan<br />

In the half century since World War II, the US military has<br />

been designed <strong>to</strong> battle masses <strong>of</strong> communist ground and air<br />

forces on and over the plains <strong>of</strong> Central Europe. Many believed<br />

the military could operate as well in other locales against lesser<br />

threats; and since it could fight and win a large war against a<br />

major foe, surely it could fight and win a small one against a<br />

lesser one. But the conflicts in both Korea (1950–53) and Vietnam<br />

(1965–72) demolished this assumption, as air units there<br />

had at best mixed results. Some would even insist the <strong>Air</strong>men’s<br />

efforts in Vietnam were both expensive and counterproductive.<br />

The American military’s next major combat test would come<br />

within months <strong>of</strong> the fall <strong>of</strong> the communist empire and the end<br />

<strong>of</strong> the Cold War. Like the previous two wars, this one would<br />

also be thousands <strong>of</strong> miles from Europe, against a foe mainly<br />

equipped with Soviet materiel, and fought with a force configured<br />

for the NATO defense <strong>of</strong> Western Europe. However, unlike<br />

the conflicts in Northeast and Southeast Asia, after more than 40<br />

years, the US military would finally fight its kind <strong>of</strong> fight. 1<br />

War in the Persian Gulf<br />

The Iraqis had just fought a long, bitter war against the<br />

Iranians (1980–88). They survived that costly war, and arguably<br />

won it, or at least did not lose it. During that conflict, air operations<br />

were secondary, with both sides preserving rather than<br />

employing their air forces. Apparently, the Iraqis intended <strong>to</strong><br />

repeat that strategy in the Gulf War, that is, <strong>to</strong> preserve their<br />

air force and rely on ground-based air defenses <strong>to</strong> protect them<br />

from coalition air power. As one commenta<strong>to</strong>r so well put it: the<br />

Iraqis were “prepared <strong>to</strong> refight their last war while the coalition<br />

prepared <strong>to</strong> fight the next [one].” 2 The Iraqis failed <strong>to</strong> recognize<br />

that the coalition was a far different foe than the Iranians.<br />

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