Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

OPERATIONS BETWEEN VIETNAM AND THE PERSIAN GULF
A Damned Close-Run Thing,” Air Force Magazine, February 1974, 39; and
Hotz, “The Shock,” 9.
11. Ehud Yonay, No Margin for Error: The Making of the Israeli Air Force
(New York: Pantheon, 1993), 321; Nordeen, Air Warfare, 349, 351; and Jeffrey
Greenhunt, “Air War: Middle East,” Aerospace Historian, March 1976, 22.
12. Rodwell, “The Mid-East War,” 39; Dupuy, Elusive Victory, 552; Nordeen,
Air Warfare, 156; Luttwak and Horowitz, The Israeli Army, 349; Insight Team,
The Yom Kippur War, 187–88, 370; Coleman, “The Israeli Air Force,” 19; Bill
Gunston et al., War Planes: 1945–1976 (London: Salamander, 1976), 58;
Walker, Fighting Jets, 149; and Borgart, “The Vulnerability,” pt. 3, 1064.
13. Insight Team, The Yom Kippur War, 204; Walker, Fighting Jets, 150;
Coleman, “The Israeli Air Force,” 18; and Yonay, No Margin for Error, 353.
14. Yonay, No Margin for Error, 313. Another author states that the IAF
destroyed 28 SAM sites and the Israeli army 12 others. See Herzog, War of
Atonement, 242, 259; Insight Team, The Yom Kippur War, 338; Herzog, Arab-
Israeli Wars, 285, 341; and Rubenstein and Goldman, Shield, 127, 129.
15. Greenhouse, “The Israeli Experience,” 597–98; Herzog, Arab-Israeli
Wars, 346–47; Herzog, War of Atonement, 257; Luttwak and Horowitz, The
Israeli Army, 347; Nordeen, Air Warfare, 163–66; M. J. Armitage and R. A.
Mason, Air Power in the Nuclear Age, 2d ed. (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois,
1985), 134; Roy Braybrook, “Is It Goodbye to Ground Attack?” Air International,
May 1976, 234–44; Charles Wakebridge, “The Technological Gap in the Middle
East,” National Defense (May–June 1975): 461; and “SA-6–Arab Ace,” 779.
16. John Kreis, Air Warfare and Air Base Air Defense, 1914–1973 (Washington,
D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1988), 336.
17. “Bekaa Valley Combat,” Flight International, 16 October 1982, 1110;
Herzog, The War of Atonement, 260; Insight Team, The Yom Kippur War, 315;
Kreis, Air Warfare and Air Base, 336; Thomas Walczyk, “October War,” Strategy
and Tactics (March–April 1977): 10; Martin van Creveld, The Washington
Papers, Military Lessons of the Yom Kippur War—Historical Perspectives, no. 24
(Beverly Hills/London: Sage Publications, 1975): 31; Borgart, “The Vulnerability,”
1064, 1066; Rubenstein and Goldman, Shield, 128; Herzog, Arab-Israeli
Wars, 347; and Ropelewski, “Egypt Assesses,” 16.
18. Rubenstein and Goldman, Shield, 13; Dupuy, Elusive Victory, 592;
Nordeen, Air Warfare, 151; Herzog, Arab-Israeli Wars, 266; Herzog, War of
Atonement, 258; and Lawrence Whetten and Michael Johnson, “Military
Lessons of the Yom Kippur War,” World Today, March 1974, 109.
19. Herzog, The War of Atonement, 260–61; Corddry, “The Yom Kippur
War–1973,” 508; Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, appendix;
Walczyk, “October War,” 10; William Staudenmaier, “Learning from the
Middle East War,” Air Defense Trends, April–June 1975, 18; “Israeli Aircraft,
Arab SAMs in Key Battle,” 14; Rubenstein and Goldman, Shield, 128; and
Borgart, “The Vulnerability,” 1066. A number of factors contribute to the
discrepancy in losses. Besides the differences in the training, leadership,
motivation, and doctrine of the opposing forces, two other factors stand out:
Soviet versus Western hardware and the Arab lack of ECM equipment and
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