Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

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BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 74. GWAPS, vol. 2, Operations and Effects and Effectiveness, 118; Hallion, Storm over Iraq, 180; and Snodgrass, “Attacking the Theater Mobile Ballistic Missile,” 87. 75. The Scuds emitted one-third the heat signature of an ICBM. See Cordesman and Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, 862; and Donald Kutyna, “Space Systems in the Gulf War,” draft, 138. 76. Gulf War Air Power Survey, Command and Control (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1993), 248–50; GWAPS, vol. 4, Weapons, Tactics, and Training, 280–81. This warning was an important factor in the relatively low casualty rate. One reason the V-2 ballistic missile was so much more deadly (five killed per missile) than the V-1 flying bomb (0.6 kills per missile) during World War II was that the former gave no warning as it arrived at supersonic speeds, while the latter flew at subsonic speeds with a very distinctive sound that stopped before its last plunge. See Hallion, Storm over Iraq, 186; and Kenneth P. Werrell, The Evolution of the Cruise Missile (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 1985), 60–61. For slightly different figures but the same conclusion, see Lewis, “Casualties and Damage,” 4–5. The satellites were not infallible. For example, on one occasion, they mistook a B-52 strike for a Scud launch. See Tom Clancy with Chuck Horner, Every Man a Tiger (New York: Putnam, 1999), 385, 464; and Gary Waters, Gulf Lesson One—The Value of Air Power: Doctrinal Lessons for Australia (Canberra, Australia: Air Power Studies Centre, 1992), 217. 77. Part of the reason for the disparity in the rate of success in the two areas came from different crews, doctrine, and conditions. See Cordesman and Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, 871–74; Coyne, Airpower in the Gulf, 122; GWAPS, vol. 2, Operations and Effects and Effectiveness, 118n; GWAPS, vol. 4, Weapons, Tactics, and Training, 280n; Hallion, Storm over Iraq, 185; Stewart Powell, “Scud War, Round Three,” Air Force Magazine, October 1992, 35; and Snodgrass, “Attacking the Theater Mobile Ballistic Missile,” 88–90. 78. Ted Postal, letter to the editor, International Security (Summer 1992), 226; General Accounting Office, Operation Desert Storm: Data Does Not Exist to Conclusively Say How Well Patriot Performed, September 1992, 3–4; and Steven Hildreth, “Evaluation of US Army Assessment of Patriot Antitactical Missile Effectiveness in the War Against Iraq,” Congressional Research Service, April 1992, 7, 16. 79. Postal letter, 235n, 237–39. 80. Postal, “Lessons of the Gulf War Experience with Patriot,” 146; and Theodore Postal, “Lessons for SDI from the Gulf War Patriot Experience: A Technical Perspective,” testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, 16 April 1991, 4, AUL. For a defense of the Patriot, see Robert Stein, “Patriot ATBM Experience in the Gulf War,” International Security (Summer 1992): 199–225. The participants in this fight had a specific agenda—they were contesting the facts for the impact of the Patriot’s Gulf War performance on SDI and National Ballistic Missile Defense. For a more balanced 215
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE view, see Alexander Simon, “The Patriot Missile: Performance in the Gulf War Reviewed,” July 1996, http://www.cdi.org/issues/bmd/Patriot.html. 81. Atkinson, Crusade, 147–48, 175; Clancy, Every Man a Tiger, 321, 379; GWAPS, vol. 2, Operations and Effects and Effectiveness, 182; 330, 335; GWAPS, vol. 5, Statistical Compendium, 418; Gordon and Trainor, The Generals’ War, 237–38; Thomas Keaney and Eliot Cohen, Revolution in Warfare? (Annapolis: Naval Institute, 1995), 73n; Mason, “The Air Power,” 217; and Snodgrass, “Attacking the Theater Mobile Ballistic Missile,” 3. 82. Atkinson, Crusade, 177–81; GWAPS, vol. 2, Operations and Effects and Effectiveness, 330–31; Gordon and Trainor, The Generals’ War, 241, 245–46; Hallion, Storm over Iraq, 181; Keaney and Cohen, Revolution, 73; and Scales, Certain Victory, 186. 83. Cordesman and Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, 331–32; GWAPS, vol. 4, Weapons, Tactics, and Training, 292–93; and Gordon and Trainor, The Generals’ War, 240. The Scud problem could have been much worse. If the missile had been more modern, it could have been maneuvering and more accurate. It also could have been used in greater numbers, armed with chemical warheads, or with a more dependable warhead. (Of 39 warheads that impacted in Israel, only a third detonated. See Lewis, “Casualties and Damage,” 1.) 84. James Winnefeld, Preston Niblack, and Dana Johnson, League of Airmen (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1994), 132, 134. 216
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Report Documentation Page Form Appr
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Air University Library Cataloging D
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Contents Chapter Page DISCLAIMER .
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CONTENTS Chapter Page 7 BALLISTIC M
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CONTENTS Figure Page 30 George Pred
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CONTENTS Figure Page 70 Blowpipe .
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Foreword Dr. Kenneth Werrell’s hi
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About the Author Dr. Kenneth P. Wer
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PREFACE excluded from the original
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PREFACE always been a factor in air
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Artillery Institute
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ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE THROUGH WORLD
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Figure 7. British 40 mm light antia
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES American air
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES company deliv
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES (discussed la
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES flak rockets
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES 1953, the rat
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES to 1,285 in J
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES Figure 40. Ar
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES cember 1958,
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Figure 42. Nike Hercules. The Nike
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES Airmen test-f
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES Bomarc failed
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES Despite knowl
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES Figure 47. Ha
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES Army decided
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES The third fam
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES with both les
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES that fired ov
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES Figure 53. Br
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES The two-decad
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES A. H. Peterso
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES “SAMs Spur
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Chapter 3 Airmen versus Guerrillas:
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AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS the next y
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AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS war with t
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AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS Figure 56.
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AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS firings fr
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AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS and Navy c
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AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS American A
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AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS but modifi
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AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS In all, du
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AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS least an e
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AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS War Vietna
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AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS D.C.: Depa
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AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS 97, 121; a
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Chapter 4 Operations between Vietna
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OPERATIONS BETWEEN VIETNAM AND THE
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BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE IN THE 19
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BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE IN THE 19
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Chapter 8 Summary, Trends, and Conc
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SUMMARY, TRENDS, AND CONCLUSIONS ev
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SUMMARY, TRENDS, AND CONCLUSIONS te
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SUMMARY, TRENDS, AND CONCLUSIONS EC
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Index A-1, 128, 227-28, 232 A-4, 12
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INDEX Convair, 98 Crotale, 158 D-da
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INDEX Gulf of Tonkin incident, 115
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INDEX Remagen, 24, 57, 270 RF-4C, 1
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INDEX SAM, 34, 74, 81-82, 84, 87, 9
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Archie to SAM A Short Operational H
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